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Introductory Note
On July 15, 1941 an indictment prepared by the United
States Department of Justice was handed down by a federal
grand jury in St. Paul, Minnesota, against 29 members of the
Socialist Workers P'a rty and Motor Transport Workers Local
544-CIO. It had been preceded by raids on the branch offices
of the party in St. Paul and Minneapolis, in which large quantities of literature had been carted off by the FBI. The indictment was on two counts: (1) conspiracy to overthrow the
government by force and violence--the statute involved was
adopted in 1861 against the slaveholders' rebellion; (2) conspiracy to advocate such overthrow and to incite disaffection
in the arnled forces, being a violation of the Smith "Gag"
Law of 1940.
I

The trial opened in Minneapolis October 27 and lasted
five weeks. The jury was out 58 hours. All defendants were
acquitted on the first count. Eighteen defendants, including
the outstanding leaders of the Socialist Workers Party, were
convicted on the second count. On Dece~ber 8--the day the
United States declared war-twelve defendants were given
16-month prison sentences and six were sentenced to terms of
a year and a day. At present all are out on bail while the convictions are being appealed to the higher courts.
The policy of the defense in this historic trial is analyzed
and discussed in the following pages from two different points
of view. Grandizo Munis criticizes the courtroom policy of
the defendants and James P. Cannon defends it.
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·· A Criticism of the
Minneapolis Trial
By GRANDIZO MUNIS
The initiation on the part of the United States government of
a prosecution of the Socialist Workers Party and of the leaders of
the Drivers Union of Minneapolis made us fear a decapitation,
even though temporary, of our American movement. It filled us
with a joyful hope at the same time, sure that the persecution by
the bourgeois tribunals would popularize our revolutionary ideas
when it gave our militants the opportunity to expound them completely and valiantly. It has been the norm and pride of the world
revolutionary movement since the ringing reply of Louisa Michel
to h~r judges and of Karl Marx to the Bismarckian tribunal, to
convert the accused into accusers and to employ the witness stand
as a fortress from which to attack the reactionary powers. This
attitude has been one of the principal forces of attraction Qf the
revolutionary movement.
I experienced the first uneasiness that these results would be
wasted totally or partially on reading the· first published statement
(THE MILITANT, Vol. V, No. 29) that seems to have set the
tone for all the following statements. I recovered hope during the
first sessions of the trial, during which our comrades energetically
brought out the reactionary role of the government aided by Tobin
against the Drivers of S44-CIO. But I again considered as lost a
goodly part of the political benefits of the trial On reading the fundamental speeches and questionings of Comrade Cannon by Comrade Goldman, and by the prosecutor (Schweinhaut). It was there,
replying to the political accusations-struggle against the war, a4vocacy of violence, overthrow of the government by force-where
it was necessary to have raised the tone and turn the tables, accuse
the governJIlent and the bourgeoisie of a reactionary conspiracy; of
permanent violence against the majority of the population, physical,
economic, moral, educative violence; of launching the population into
a slaughter also by means of violence in order to defend the Sixty
Families. On the contrary, it is on arriving at this part that the
trial visibly weakens, our comrades shrink themselves, minimize
the revolutionary significance of their ideas, try to make an honor-

able impression on the jury without taking into consideration that
they should talk for the ·masses. For moments they border on a
renunciation of principles. A few good words by Goldman in his
closing speech cannot negate .the lamentable, negative impression
of his first speech and of the interrogation of Cannon.
I shall begin to criticize them by citing their words, taken
textually from numbers 45, 47, 48, SO, 52, Volume V, of THE
MiI LITANT.
Goldman in his opening statement to the j~ry:
"I repeat: The objective and the aim of the party 'lJXL.S to win
through education and through propaganda a majority of the people
of the United States." (Underlined in the original.)

It is exactly the same as the statement in July before the beginning of the trial. Answering a criticism made then from Mexico,
a comrade of certain responsibility in the SWP replied that there
was no need to worry because no one was in agreement with that
statement. I f no one was in agreement, then it was necessary to
formulate another, that is evident, unless we have one policy for
the masses and another for appearances before a bourgeois judge.
It is hardly necessary to indicate the error of such a statement. It
is understood by all~ beginning by the one who made the statement, that our objective can in no way be only propaganda, nor
will we win the majority by means of it. Weare a party of propaganda in the sense that our numerical proportion preven~s us or
limits us to a minimum of action. But we are a party of revolutionary action-economic, political and educative-.-in esse.nce and
potentially, because our propaganda itself can tend only to action
and only through action will we conquer the majority of the exploited and educate them for the taking of power.
I insist on these cOlnmonplaces because the euphemistic, sweetened character of this preliminary statement of Goldman, designed
to reconcile the jury, is a compromise that has forced later statements much more grave. We .will see further on . .
Let us take the main problems and see how they have been
dealt with in the tria1.

1. The Struggle Against Imperialist War
Goldman begins with the following statement:
"We shall show that the Socialist Workers Party O'pPos,e s sabotage. We s·h all show that Mr. Anderson's c1aiml is absolutely wrong
and based on no foundation ·w hatever to the effect that we pref.e r the
enemy, the iDl/perialistic enemy of the United States, to d~eat our
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government. It is absolutely false. What we want, as the evidence
will s-how, is to have the workers and farm~rs establish their own
government, and then to continue a real war against fascism."

. Cannon even goes a bit further, replying to a question by
Goldman:
"l\. decision has been made, and is accepted by a majority of the
people, to go to war. Our comrades have to. comply with that."
And then Goldman asks : "You would not support the war?"
Cannon: "That is what I mean, we would not support the war
In a political sense."
And he even returns again to. the point ~
uWe consider -H itler and Hitlerism the greatest .enemy of mankind. We -w ant to wipe it off the face of the earth. The reason we
do not sUlPPort a declaration of war !by Am.e riea.n arms, is becaus,e
we do not believe the Amerkan capitalists can defeat Hitler and
fascism. We think Hitlerism can be destroyed only by way of conducting a war under the leadership of the workers."

In the first place, the decision to. go to war has not "been made
and accepted by a majority of the people." This statement can be
criticized very strongly, a statement that we would censure very
energ.etically if it were made by a centrist. In place of accusing the
government of leading the American people to. the slaughter against
the will of the majority, instead of accusing it emphatically before
the masses and of demonstrating to them how the parliamentarian
majority acts against the majority of the peo.ple, Cannon endorses
Roosevelt's decision as if it really corresponded to the majority of
the people.
Yes, 'we submit to. the war and our militants go to war, but
not because it is a decision of the majority, but rather because it
is imposed upon us by the violence of the bo.urgeois society just as
wage exploitation is imposed. As in the factory, we should take
advantage of all the opportunities to. fight against the war and
against the s¥stem that produces it, just as we fight against the boss
in a factory, as a function of the general struggle against the capitalist system.
"We would not support the war in a political sense," says
Cannon. Do we support it, perhaps, in so.me other sense? Social,
economic? I do not see other senses. Does he perhaps mean by
"to support" to accept the accomplished fact and to go to. war? That
is, to. submit oneself, as we submit to the conditions imposed by a
boss after the failure of a strike, but preparing ourselves for another. Why, then, equivocate so dangero.usly? I see no other reason but that our comrades have committed the very g;rave error of
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talking for a petty-bourgeois jury, for the more immediate present,
not foreseeing the future struggles. Would it not have been better
to state ~ "We submit to your war, American bourgeois, because the
violence of your society imposes it on us, the material violence of
your arms. But the masses will turn against you. From today on,
our party is with the masses in an irreconcilable struggle against
your regi~e of oppression, misery and butchery. Therefore we will
fight against your war ·with
means."
The equivocation and inexactness are permanent. It seems
that 'we are platonic opponents of the war and that we limit ourselves to statements and propaganda, written or verbal, without
action of any kind. TO'say that "we do not support a declaration
of 'w ar because we do not believe the American capitalists can dedefeat Hitler and fascism" is to give the understanding that we
would support it if we believed in that defeat; this induces tho.se
who believe in the victory of the United States to support it. Our
rejection of the war is based on the character of the social regime
that produces it, not on thi·s or that belief about the defeat of fascism.
Immediately comes another equivocation: "We think Hitlerism can be destroyed, etc." Uniting that to the reiterated statements to the effect that we will not agitate among the soldiers, that
we are a "political opposition" to the war, and to the, until now ~
limping exposition of military training; under union control, can
induce one to believe that we will be for the war when the control
has been given to the unions. I believe it is necessary to clari fy
this, without leaving room for equivocation and I pronounce myself,
for my part, against the war, even if control of the military service is achieved by the unions.
Immediately, Cannon undertakes to give a program for defeating Hitler by means of a Workers' and Farmers' Government.
I don't have to add a single comma, except that the entire questioning of Cannon closes with a double door, the road to establish the
Workers' and Farmers' Government:

all

Goldmari: Now until such time as the workers and farmers in
the United States esta.blish their own government and us·e their own
methods to defeat Hitler, the S.W.P. must submit to the majority of
the people-is that right?
"Cannon: That is all we can do. That is what we propose to dO."
4

4i

All of which is the equivalent of folding one's arms after some
lectures about the marvels of the Workers' and Farmers'. Government, in the hope that this will be formed by itself, or by God
knows what sleight-of-hand.
8

This does not deal merely with an omission, but with a state.:.
ment of 'passivity in the face of the imperialist war; something
which at best is a bad education for the workers who have become
'interested in the trial and does not grant us any credit for tomorrow
when the masses begin to act against the war.
Forced by statements of this sort-decidedly opportunist, I do
..not h.esitate to say-Cannon sees himself obliged to ask for the expulsion from the party of the militants who organize protests in
the army. He is carried to the incredible, to reject Lenin, Trotsky
and Cannon himself.
Mr. Schweinhaut reads Cannon a paragraph of Lenin's from
The Re·volution of 1905:
I

" 'It is our duty in time of an uprising to exterminate ruthlessly
all the c1;liefs of the civil and military authorities.' You disagr,e e
with that?
"Cannon: Yes, I don't know that that is in any way a statement
of our Ip arty ,policy. We do not agree with the e~termination of anybody unless it is in case of an actual armed struggle when the rules
of war apply."

But, what is "an uprising" except an armed struggle? Lenin
also does not say "anybody" but rather the civil and military chiefs.
Then 'why reject the paragraph?
Citing Cannon himself, Schweinhaut reads:
'The second point (struggle in the army) is to be careful, cautious. Make no lJ)utsches, maJke no prematur~ moves that expos,e us
and separate us from the masses. Go with the masses .•.. And how
can we get these military means ,exce!pt ·b y penetrating the army as
it exists?'
HSchweinhaut: But you do not think that would obstruct the
military effort of the army?
"Cannon: If you will read it again, you will see that we do not
want any putsches. We say to the members: 'Do not mak,e any
putsches, and do not obstruct the army.' It is our direct instruction
to our people not to create obstruction of the military operations,
but to confine their efforts to propaganda."
~,

I am wholeheartedly behind Cannon in his speech; but I
categorically condemn Cannon before the jury, deforming himself,
minimizing;, reducing to words the revolutionary action of the
party. And I will be equally behind and I propose that the party
be behind the militants and soldiers who. carry out acts of protests
in the army, remembering that they do not deal with "putsches,
premature movements." Revolutionary action in time "Qf war is
absolutely impossible without obstructing in a greater or less degree the military activities. Therefore, the principle of revolution-
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ary defeatism, which the American party and the International
have and cannot renounce. Contrary to what Goldman gave to
understand in the first quotation, we are for the intensification of
the class struggle, in the rearguard and in the army, including, if
this can, provoking the defeat of our bourgeoisie:, "From the point
of view of a revolution in their own country, the defeat of their
own imperialist government is undoubtedly the better evil"
(Tro~sky, June 1940). It is worse in advice to the workers to disauthorize agitation and protests in the army, only to speak against
it. I believe that our comrades have lost a good opportunity to
make the workers understand why they should act always by means
of the word and by means of collective actions. The questioning of
Cannon presented a completely false perspective to the workers,
of comfortable propaganda, where it deals with a terrible struggle
by all means from small protests . to insurrections by groups, from
partial fraternizations to wiping out the fronts. But, from an
error of perspective, one passes to an error of fact; therefore the
defendants saw themselves forced to condemn sabotage in general,
as though it dealt with something criminal. I believe that sabotage
is a method for tactical use whose application at certain moments
can be productive of contrary effects to what is intended but which
is absolutely indispensable in the critical moments of struggle.
An example will demonstrate it. Suppose that in a certain
part of the front conditions of fraternization are produced. Fraternization will never be produced simultaneously on both sides of a
large front, nor in the same proportion. Immediately the military
chiefs will give orders to mobilize, attack or reinforce the fronts
with soldiers less disposed to embrace the "enemy." Is it not our
duty then to sabotage in the greatest degree the renewal of combat,
to give time to the fraternization, to impede the command from
dominating the situation? Sabotage will be the only means at hand
for the soldiers to extend and precipitate the fraternization, until
the fall of the two fronts. Nevertheless, there exists the danger that
the enemy command may dominate its front and taking advantage
of the disorganization, undertake a victorious of fensive. There is
no way out for an effective fraternization if one wishes to avoid
that "danger."
Sabotage and defeatism will unite at a certain moment as the
two main elements in the reactions of the masses against the imperialist war. The party should not and cannot renounce defeatism without condemning itself to a perpetual sterile chat against
the war.
10

What seems even more lamentable· to me is that one can intuit
from the trial that it is not only a question of something said especially for the jury. F or moments there is evidence that the de'"! .
fendants really consider sabotage a crime. If I am not mistakenand I hope I am-this is a dangerous moral predisposition. Sabotage will be the reaction of the mas,ses against the imperialist war.
Why be ashamed of it? Why be ashamed that the masses react, as
they can, against the monstrous crime of the. present war? It would
have been easy to defend it as a principle and throw ' the responsibility on the leaders of the present war. Can we condemn the
future sabotage of the masses when the war is a gigantic sabotage
of the bourgeoisie against the masses, against civilization and humanity? Instead of receiving this idea, the workers who heard our
comrades will have left, burdened with a prejudice against sabotage.

2. Transition to Socialism, Advocating and
Employing Violence
Says Goldman:
''The evidence will further show as Mr. Anderson himselt indicated, that we prefer a peaceful transition to SOCialism; but that we
analyze all the conditions in society, we analyze history, 'and on the
basis of this analysis we !p redkt, we predict, that after the majority
, of the people in the United States will want socialism estaJbUshed,
that the minority, organized by the financiers and by carpitaUsts,
will use violence to pr,e vent the establishment of socialism. That ia
what ' we predict."

Why ,not ask forgiveness, besides, for seeing ourselves painfully obliged to employ violence against the bourgeoisie? Ev~n
neutralizing oneself to a mere diviner, the prediction is completely
false. It is not necessary to poke· into the future to discover the
violence of the reactionary minority throughout society. The accusation lends itself ideally to launching a thorough attack against
capitalist society and to show the American workers that the socalled American democracy is no more than a dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie. Among the workers 'who have read or listened to
Cannon and Goldman, there must be many who have experienced
the daily violence of bourgeois society, during strikes, demonstrations, meetings; all of them without exception experience the normal violence of either working for a wage established in the labor
market or of perishing; a violence much more lamentable is the
imposition of the war; educative violence; informative violence
imposed by the newspaper trusts. ·F ar from receiving a notion of
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the environment in which they live and far from preparing their
spirit for rebellion against this environment, the workers watching
the trial have been pacified in respect to the present. Only in the
future will the bourgeoisie employ violence.
Besides, it is completely inexact and contributes toward putting; the workers to sleep, to tell them that the bourgeoisie will employ violence "after the majority of the people in the United States
will want socialism established." It uses violence already, always
employs it, the bourgeoisie knows of no other method of government but violence. The workers and farmers should respond to
the daily violence of the bourgeoisie with majority and organized
violence of the poor masses. We do not predict, but r~ther we assure, we ask, we advocate temporary violence of the majority
against the permanent organic violence of the reactionary minority.
It is necessary to break the democratic prejudices' of the American
proletariat; but statements like that rock them to sleep.
"After all," an inexpert worker may say, "what certainty can
one have that the bourgeoisie will employ violence. These men
who know a lot, only predict it; then for the moment, I need not
organize to counter the violence of the reactionaries." This tendency to inaction will be accentuated if the worker in question continues reading: "We expect to prove that the defendants never
advocated, never incited, to violence, but simply predicted the violence of the reactionary minority." It is clear when they do not
do that, it is ~ot yet necessary.
And once more, as we saw in the case of the war, all possibility of inciting to action is closed by the preliminary obstruction.
Following their sense, the perspective presented by our comrades
for the coming years is also f~lse. .
.
What means 'will be valuable to us for conquering; the majority
of the proletariat and poor fanners? (N ot merely the people ~s is
repeated constantly in the examination. The petty-bourgeoisie can
.
be neutralized without being won over.)
I do not find in the long pages of the interrogation of Cannon
anything else than propaganda, propaganda and more propaganda,
as if it dealt with recommending a patent medicine for baldne&s.
A brief paragraph, uttered in a good direction by Cannon, is not,
unfortunately, sufficiently explicit and energetic: "Of course, we
don't limit ourself simply to that prediction. We go further-, and
advise the workers to bear this in mind and prepare themselves
not to permit the reactionary outlived minority to frustrate the
will of the majority."
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Then, why not raise the voice at this point and call upon the
workers to organize their own violence against the reactionary
violence? Immediately afterward, the perspective of struggle
against the fascist bands is perfectly sketched by Cannon; but one
notes that it deals with a ·non-existent perspective in an immediate
. fonn as if today against the false democracy it were unnecessary
to organize the shock forces of the proletariat. It is something
that is not clearly stated, it lends itself to equivocation and is reinforced by the final insistence in denying the existence (today)
of any workers' guard. At any rate, the lin~ that our comrades
have followed in not taking advantage of the trial to indicate to the
masses how and why they should exercis·e their own violence is
incorrect. Instead we have the lamentable dialogue between Cannon and Goldman destined to pacify the easily frightened co~
science of the jury about who initiates the violence.
In one manner or another it is supposed that we are going to
conquer the majority for socialism. Then
"Goldman: What is meant ,b y the eXlpression 'overthrow of the
capitaHst state'?
"Cannon: That means to replace it by a W.orkers' and Farmers'
Government; that i,s what w,e mean.
"Goldman: What is meant by the expression 'destroy the machinery of the capitalist state'?
"Cannon: By ,t hat we mean that when [underlined by me. G.M.]
we set up the Workers' and Farmers' Government in this country,
the functioning of this, its tasks, its whole nature, will ·b e so profoundly and radically different from the fuundations, tasks and nature of the bourgeois state that we will have to replace it all along
the line."

All the revolutionary, violent process, the civil war that must
precede the establishment of the Workers' and Farmers' Government and the proletarian state, is palmed away, I cannot find another ·w ord more euphemistic. Therefore, when a little bit later
Cannon has to circumscribe himself, he gives a definition of the
soviet, such as an abbreviated encyclopedia would give, hushing
everything that deals with its function as an organism of struggle,
in competition and opposition to the organisms of the bourgeois
power.
What other thing can the Workers' and Farmers' Government
be than the culmination of the struggle of the proletariat and farmers against the bourgeoisie? . That struggle has to be pushed from
now on, and beginning with the opening of the revolutionary crisis,
it will develop "in crescendo," to the point at which the masses
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will create soviets or councils that direct the general struggle of
the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, foresee the necessities of
that struggle, including the arms, and permit within its fold a
liberty of ideological struggle so that the masses can elect those
who best represent them. Only then, when the revolutionary tendency has acquired a majority of the soviets-not in the parliamentarian elections-the violent seizure of power will destroy the
bourgeois state, leaving the soviets as the base of the proletarian
state.
Cannon stated that the machine of the bourgeois state will be
destroyed "when we set up the Workers' and Farmers' Government." But the possibility of such a governffient does not open
until after we have destroyed that machine. Cannon knows this
perfectly, and undoubtedly, proposes to act accordingly. But in
that case, I insist, why lose the excellent and rare opportunity to
give the workers a lesson, indicating to them without subterfuge
the road to the struggle and power, accusing at the s~e time the
bourgeoisie of a reactionary and pro-fascist course? The predictions about how the social dialectic is going to reinforce our positions, do not have any real value for the workers. The revolutionary process is seen here as the school books will describe it in 500
years. The workers today need an indication of the dynamics of
the class struggle, the forms of organization, methods of struggle
up to the civil war, slogans, and included there is a need for proud
valour against the class enemy, something which has been rare in
the trial. The general tone has been not to accuse but to apologize
to a point that makes one feel embarrassed at times; not to indicate and propose actions and immediate means for the struggle
against the bourgeoisie and against the war, but rather to dilute
our ideas into hunlanitarianism and to veil their active value with
predictions of knowledge as if it were not honor~ble to employ
violence against the present corrupted bourgeois democracy.
Something completely demonstrative of the foregoing is that
our comrades have cited as witnesses in their defense-Jefferson,
Lincoln, the Bible, Lloyd George, MacDonald; · but when Marx,
Lenin, Trotsky and even Cannon appear, they are rejected as nonof ficial mouthpieces of our organization. This attitude, not very
valiant, ,annot conquer much sympathy, or at least cannot conquer
as much as the opposite attitude would conquer.
I know perfectly well that I am not teaching anything to anybody. What I have said is known better by the comrades to whom
it refers. They will agree with me in relation to the principles re-
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ferred to, except perhaps, in the problems of military training
under trade union control, and sabotage--questions that it is urgent
to clarify in the party and in the International. I find no more
reason for their attitude in the trial than considerations that it
would be a "useful maneuver." But it is precisely that I consider
it a very grave error to substitute maneuvers for principles in moments so important Jor the political fl:1ture of the party. I believe
and propose as a general principle that in similar trials our responsible militants accept all responsibility for the practical action of
our ideas. This is worth more than a light sentence at the price of
a pretty and deceptive polish. I propose that this criticism be published in the internal bulletins of the International and of the
S.W.p.
January 7, 1942
NOTE: This criticism has been written with extreme 'rush, in
order not to lose an immediate opportunity to transmit it. I have
not taken more than the paragraphs that first struck my eyes.
Therefore, I reserve the possibility of amplifying it.
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Political Principles and
Propaganda Methods
By JAMES P. CANNON

1. Our Strategy in the Trial
In the Minneapolis "sedition" trial, as in the months-long
trade union battle which preceded and led up to it, the American
Trotskyists were put to the test and compelled to show what stuff
they are made of. In both instances they conducted themselves in
a manner befitting disciples of Trotsky and met the test in all
respects.
In the fight with the trade union bureaucracy, which attracted
national attention, it was clearly shown who the real leaders of
militant labor, the real men of principle, really are. In the trial
before the bourgeois court the party, by the conduct of all its members involved, earned the right to the confidence of the revQlutionary workers. The two struggles, which in reality were two
sides of 'One and the same struggle, marked a climactic point in the
activity 'Of the American movement which had developed in a restricted circle since its inception thirteen years before.
Duringi that time the party, with some local exceptions, had
gained the attention only of the vanguard of class conscious workers. At the trial we had the opportunity, for the first time, to
speak to the masses-to the people of the United States. We
seized upon the opportunity and made the most of it, and applied
in practice without a serious fault the basic principles which had
been assimilated in a long preparatory period. Since then the
movement in the United States stands on higher ground.
A critical study and discussion of the trial cannot fail to ~
of the highest value to the Fourth International, especially to those
sections which have yet to reach the tum in the road which leads
from the propaganda circle to mass work. For our part, we welcome the discussion and will do our best to contribute something
useful to it.
From the first moment after the indictment was brought
against us in the Federal Court at Minneapolis last July we recog16

nized that the attack had two aspects, and we appraised each of
them, we think, at their true significance. The prosecution was
designed to outlaw the party and deprive it, perhaps for a long
time, of the active services of a number of its most experienced
leaders. At the same time it w.as obvious that the mass trial, properly handled on our part, could give us our first real opportunity
to make the party and its principIes known to wide circles of
workers and to gain a sympathetic hearing from them.
Our strategy, from the beginning, took both sides of the problem into account. N ~turally, we decided to utilize to the fullest extent each and every legal protection, technicality and resource
a vailable to us under the law and the constitution. A party leadership hesitating or neglecting to do this would frivolously jeopardize the legality of the party and show a very wasteful attitude
indeed toward party cadres. Such a leadership would deserve only
to be driven out with sticks and stones.
On the other hand, we planned to conduct our defense in
court not as a "criminal" defense but as a propaganda offensive.
Without foolishly disregarding or provoking the jury or needlessly
helping the prosecutor, it was our aim to use the courtroom as a
forum to popularize the principles of our movement. We saw in
thi$ second proposition our main duty and opportunity and never
for a moment intended to let purely legalistic considerations take
precedence over it. Therefore ,we sternly rejected the repeated advice of. attorneys-some who assisted Goldman in the trial of the
case as well as others who were consulted about participation-to
eliminate or play down our "propaganda" program and leave the
defense policy to the lawyers.
From the rather unhappy experiences of past trials of militants in the courts of the United States we knew what following
such advice would mean ~ Deny or keep quiet about the revolutionary principles of the movement; permit the lawyers to disavow
and ridicule the defendants, and pass them "off as somewhat foolish people belonging to a party which is not to be taken seriously;
and depend on spread-eagle speeches of the lawyers to the jury
to get the defendants off some way or other.
The October Plenum-Conference of the party unanimously
endorsed the National Committee's recommendations on courtroom
policy. The resolution q£ the conference laid down the policy as
follows:
''The poliey of the party in defending itself in court, obligatory
for all ,p arty mem bers under indictment. can only be one that is
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worthy of our movement and our tradiUon; no attempt to water
d-own or evade our revolutionary doctrine, but, -on the contrary, to
defend it militantly. At the same tim.e we maintain that we have a
legal right under the Bill of Rights to propagate our ~rinciples:'

That is the policy we took with us to the trial. It guided us
at every step in the proceedings. And we think it can be safely
said that the policy has been amply vindicated by the results. Our
principles were widely popularized, a hundred or a thousand times
better than ever before, and our conduct before the court has met
with approval and sympathy from the militant workers who followed the trial and read the testimony.
The trial was by far our greatest propaganda success. Moreover, even those workers who disagree with our program, have
approved and applauded our conduct in court as worthy of people
who take their principles ~eriously. Such is the testimony of all
comrades who have reported on the reaction of the workers to the
trial. On a recent tour across the country from branch to branch
of the party we heard the same unvarying report everywhere.
Naturally, our work in the trial was not perfect; we did only
the best we could within the narrow limits prescribed by the court.
More qualified people can quite easily point out things here and
there which might have been done more cleverly. We can readily
acknowledge the justice of such criticisms without thereby admitting any guilt on our part, for socialism does not require that all
be endowed with equal talent, but only that each give according to
his ability. It is a different matter when Comrade M unis-and
other critics of our policy. accuse us of misunderstanding our task
and departing from Marxist principles in the trial. To them we
are obliged to say firmly: No, the misunderstanding is all on your
s!de. The correct understanding of our task in the courtroom and
the sanction of the Mfarxist authorities, are on our side.
In undertaking to prove this contention we must begin with
a brief analysis of a point overlooked by M unis as well as by
the others: the social environment in which the trial was conducted. Our critics nowhere, by so much as a si~gle word, refer
to the objective situation in the United States; the political fonns
still prevailing here; the degree of political maturity-more properly, immaturity-of the American proletariat; the relation of class
forces; the size and stat~s of the party-in short, to the specific
peculiarities of our problem which should determine our method
of approach to workers hearing us for the first time .from the
souriding board of the trial.
18

Our critics talk in ·terms of trials in general and principles in
general, which, it would appear, are always to be formulated and
explained to the \'Torkers in general in precisely the same way. We,
on the contrary, dealt with a specific trial and attempted to explain
ourselves to the workers as they are in the United States in the
year 1941. Thus we clash with our critics at the very point of departure-the analysis, the method. Our answer to their criticism
must take the same form.
We shall begin by first setting forth the concrete environmental circumstances in which our party functioned in the United
States at the time of the trial and the specific tasks and propaganda
techniques which, in our opinion, were thereby imposed. Then we
shall proceed to submit our position, as well as that of our critics,
to the criterion which must be decisive for all of us: the expressions of the Marxist teachers on the application of the points of
principle under discussion. *

2. The Setting of the Trial
The United States, where the trial took place, is by far the
richest of all the capitalist nations, and because of that has been
one of the few such nations still able to afford the luxury of bourgois democratic forms in the epoch of the decline and decay of
capitalism. Trade unions, which have been destroyed in one European country after another in the past decade, have flourished
and more than doubled their membership in the United S~ates in
the same period-partly with governmental encouragement. Free
speech and free press, obliterated or reduced to travesty in other
lands, have been virtually unrestricted here. Elections have been
held under the normal bourgeois democratic forms, traditional in
America for more than a century, and the great mass of the workers have freely participated in them. The riches and favored position of bourgeois America have also enabled it, despite the devastating crisis, to maintain living standards of the workers far above
those of any other country.
These objective circumstances have unfailingly affected both
the mentality of the workers and the fortunes of the revolutionary
political movement. The revolutionary implications of the shaken
economy, propped up for the time being by the armaments boom,
are as yet but slightly reflected in the consciousness of the workers.
In their outlook they are far from revolutionary. "Politics" to

* All

Quotati-ons cited in this document are from the EngUsh texts.
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them means voting for one or another of the big capitalist parties.
The simple fact that the organized labor movement has not yet
resorted to independent political action, even on a reformist basis,
but remains in its political activity an appendage of the Roosevelt
political party-this simple fact in itself shows conclusively that
the American workers have not yet begun to translate their fier~e
militancy on the field of economic strikes, directed at individual employers, into terms of independent politics directed against the
employers as a class. As for the Marxist party, with its program
of the revolutionary transformation of society, it has been able in
such an environment to attract the attention of only a few thousands to its message and to recruit into its ranks a still smaller
number of the most advanced and class conscious militants.
The forty million American workers, casting an almost solid
labor vote for Roosevelt, remain in the first primitive stages of
class political development; they are soaked through and through
with bourgeois democratic illusions; they are discontented to a
certain extent and partly union conscious but not class conscious;
they have a fetishistic respect for the Federal government as the
government of all the people and hope to better conditions for themselves by voting for "friendly" hourgeois politicians; they hate and
fear fascism which they identify with Hitler; they understand socialism and communism only in the version disseminated by the bourgeois press, and are either hostile or indifferent to it; the real meaning of socialism, the revolutionary Marxist meaning, is unknown to
the great majority.
Such were the general external factors, and such was the mentality of the American workers, confronting our party at the time
of the Minneapolis trial, October, November, and December 1941.
What specific tasks, what propaganda techniques were imposed
thereby? It seems to us that the answers are obvious. The task
was to get a hearing for our ideas from the forum of the trial.
These ideas had to be simplified as much as possible, tnade plausible to the workers and illustrated whenever possible by familiar
examples from American history. We had to address ourselves
to the workers not in general, not as an abstraction, but ' as they
exist in reality in the United States in the year 1941. We had to
recognize that the forms of democracy and the legality of the party
greatly facilitate this propaganda work and must not be lightly disregarded. It was not our duty to facilitate the work of the prosecuting attorney but to make it more d~fficult, insofar as this could
be done 'without renouncing any principle. Such are the consid era20

tions which g,uided us in our work at the trial.
Our critics do not refer to them; evidently they did not even
think of them. Our method is a far different method than the
simple repetition of formulas about "action" which requires nothing but a good memory. More precisely, it is the Marxist method
of applying principles to concrete circumstances in order to popularize a party and create a movement which can lead to action in
the real life of the class struggle, not on the printed page where
the "action" of sectarian formalists always begins and ends.
The accomplishment of our main task-to use the courtroom
as a forum from which to speak to those American workers, as
they are, ·who might hear us for the first time-required, in our
judgment, not a call to arms but patient, school-room explanations
of our doctrines and ourselves, and a quiet tone. Therefore we
adapted, not our principles but our propaganda technique to the
occasion as we understood it. The style of propaganda and the
tone which we employed are not recommended as a universally applicable formula. Our propaganda style and tone were simply designed to serve the requirements, in .the given situation, of a small.
minority Marxist party in a big country of democratic capitalism
in the general historic circumstances above described.
.
Comrade M unis accuses us 0 f popularizing our propaganqa .
and defending ourselves (and the party's legality) at the expense
of principle. Our s.tatements at the trial are held to be "decidedly·
opportunist"; to "border on a renunciation of principles." Following such and similar assertions we are informed that "it is a very
grave error to substitute maneuvers for principles." This maximnot entirely original in our movement-can be accepted with these
provisos: that the maxim be understood; that a distinction be
made bet'ween "maneuvers" which serve principle and those which
contradict it; and that it be applied to actual and not imaginary
sacrifices of principle. This is the gist of the whole matter. The
Marxist teachers did not change their principles, but in explaining
them they frequently changed their manner and tone and points
of emphasis to suit occasion. We had a right and a duty to do the
same. An examination of our testimony from this standpoint will
bring different conclusions from those which our critics have so
hastily drawn.

3. Violence and the Transition to Socialism
We .were charged in the first count of the indictment with
"conspiracy to overthrow the government by force and violence"
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in violation of the statute of 1861 which was originally directed
against the slave-holders' rebellion. In the second count we were
charged, among other things, with "conspiracy to advocate, the
overthrow of the government by force and violence" in violation
of the Smith Act of 1940.
In our defense we flatly denied we had either "conspired" or
"advocated" violence, and by that we did not in the least intend
to deny or repudiate any principle of Marxism. 'Ve claimed the
right to c%plain our position. We testified that 'we prefer a peaceful social transformation; that the bourgeoisie takes the initiativ~
in violence and will not permit a peaceful change; that we advise
the workers to bear this in mind and prepare to defend themselves
against the violence of the outlived reactionary minority class.
This formula-which is 100 per cent correct in the essence of
the matter and unassailable from the standpoint of Marxist authority-did not coincide with the contentions of the prosecuting
attorney, nor help him to prove his case against us. But that was
not our duty. From entirely opposite considerations our exposition does not meet with the approval of Comrade M unis nor coincide with his conceptions. That is not our duty either, because
his conceptions are arbitrary and formalistic-and therefore false.
The prosecutor wanted to limit the whole discussion of socialism to the single question of "force and violence." We on the
other hand-for the first time in an American courtroom-tried
to make an exposition, if only a brief and sketchy one, of the
whole range of Marxist theory, as in an elementary study class
for uninitiated workers, to the extent that this was possible within
the narrow frame-work prescribed by the court's rules and the
repeated objections of the prosecutor, assigning the question of
force in the social revolution to its proper proportionate place and
putting the responsibility for it where it properly belongs-on the
shoulders of the outlived class.
We carried out this task to the' best of our ability at the trial.
Of course, thesis precision and full-rounded explanation are hardly
possible in a rapid-fire impromptu dialogue, with answers compressed to extreme brevity by time limitations, prosecutor's objections and court ruling,s. We cannot claim such precision and
amplitude for our answers, and reasonable people should not demand it of us. Even Trotsky admitted the possibility of flaws in
testimony which he gave in somewhat similar but more favorable
circumstances before the Dewey Commission. In reply to Ver, who
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bad criticized one of his answers in the published record of the
Inquiry, he said:
"It is possible that there is some laek of lPTecision in the stenographic report. It is not a -m atter her,e either of a programmatic
text well thought out, or even of an article, but of a stenographic
report drawn up lb y the Commission. You .k now that I did not even
have the chance to revise it myself. Some misunderstandings, imprecisions may have crept in. Enemies can make use of them, but
serious com.r ades must grasp the question in its totality." (Internal
Bulletin of the Socialist Workers Party, No.3.)

Here it may be in order to explain that American court procedure, unlike that of many other countries, does .not permit defendants to introduce worked-out statements and "declarations." They
must answer orally, they must make their answers short and are
liable to be cut off at any time by the objection of the prosecutor
or the ruling of the judge. In such an atmosphere a witness is
under constant pressure to condense his answers and to omit explanations which may be necessary for full clarity but which are
not interesting to the court.
.
We mention these factors only to ask the same kind of reasonable allowance for short-comings which Trotsky asked, not to
disavow anything we said. By and large, making all due acknowledgment of imperfections, omissions and inadequacies in the oral
testimony, we accomplished our propagandistic aims at the trial,
and we stand on the record. The court record, published in thousands
of copies, became and will remain our most effective propaganda
document. It is an honest and forthright revolutionary record.
Nobody 'will succeed ' in discrediting it.
What did we say about violence in the transformation of s0ciety from capitalism to socialism? This is what we said:
1) The Marxists prefer a peaceful transition. "'The position of the
Marxists is that the most economical and ~referable, the moOst desira·ble method of social transformation, by all .means, is toO have
it done peacefully." (From the court record, Socialism on Trial,
page 34.)
2) "It is the Qpinion of all Marxists that it will be accompanied by
violence." (Socialism on Trial, page 33.)
3) That opinion "i's based, like all Marxist doctrine, on a study ot
history, th~ historical experiences of mankind in the numerous
changes of society from one form to another, the revolutions
which acc.ompanied it, and the resistance which the outlived .
classes -invariably ·p ut up against the new order. Their attempt
to defend themselves against the new !Order, or to suppress by
violeuce the movement for the new or~er, has resulted in every
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important social transformation up to now being accompanied
by violence." (Socialism on Trial, page 33.)
4) The -ruling class always initiates the violence, "always the ruling
class; always the outlived class that doesn't want to leave the
stage when the time has oome. They want to hang onto their
privileges, to reinforce them by violent measures, against the
risin.g majority ana they run up against the mass violence of the
new class, which history has ordained shall com,e to power." (is<>cialism on Trial, !page 33.)
5) That is our prediction. But "of course, we don't limit ourselves
simply to that predktion. We go further, and advise the workers
to bear this in mind and 'p repare themselv,e s not to permit the
reactionary o'utlived minority to frustrat.e the will of the majority." (Socialism on Trial, page 35.)
"QUESTION: What role does the rise and existence of ta.seism
play with ref,e rence to the possibility of violence?
HANSWER: Well, that is really the nub o'f the whole question,
!because the reacUonary violence of the eapitalist class, expressed
through fascism, is invoked against the workers. Long beto·r e the
revolutionary movement of th~ workers gains the majority, fascist gangs are organized and subsidized ,b y millions in funds from
the ,b iggest i~dustrialists and financiers, as the example of Germany showed-and thes~ fascist gangs undertake to break up the
labor movement by force, raid the halls, assassinate the leaders,
·break up the meetings, burn the printing !plants, arid destroy the
possibility of functioning long ·b efore the labor move'm ent has
taken the road of revolution.
"I say that is the nub of the whole question of violence. If the
workers don't recognIze that, and do not begin to defend them'Belves against the fascists, t~ey will never be given the pos'Siibility
of voting on the question of revolution. They will .face the fate
" of the German and Italian proletariat and they will be in the
chains of fascist slavery before they hav,~ a .chance of any kind
,of a fair vote on whether they want Socialism or not.
"It is a life and death question for the workers that they organize themselves to prevent faseism, the fascist gangs, from
.breaking up .the workers' organizations, · and not to wait until it
is too late. T·h at is the program of our pa·rty." (Socialism on
Trial, page 35.)

That is all any Marxist really needs to say on the question
of violence in a capitalist court or at a propaganda meeting for
workers at the present time in the United States. It tells the truth,
conforms to pri~ciple,. and protects the legal position of the party.
The workers will understand it too. To quote Shakespeare's Mer-
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cutio: "'Tis not ~o ~eep as ~,well, nor so wide as a church-door;
...
"
but 'tis enough, twdl serve..
Comrade Munis, however, 1S not satIsf1ed wIth our lamentable
dialogue," allegedly "destined t~ ~~cify the e~si1y fr~¥htened conscience of the jury about who 1n1tIates the v10lence. The above
quoted answer advising the workers to "bear in mind" the violent
course of the ruling class and "prepare themselves," is not "sufficiently explicit and energetic." (He underestimates the acuteness
of the workers.) "Why not," says Comrade M unis, "raise the
voice at this point and call upon the workers to organize their own
violence against the reactionary violence?"
Why not? Because it was not necessary or advisable ~ither
to raise the voice or issue any call for action at this time. We were
talking, in the first place, for the benefit of the uninitiated worker
who would be reading the testimony in the paper or in pamphlet
form. We needed a calm and careful exposition in order to get
his attention. This worker is by no means 'w aiting impatiently
for our call to violent action. Quite the contrary, he ardently beheves in the so-called democracy, and the first question he will
ask, if he becomes interested in socialism, is: "Why can't we get
it peacefully, by the ballot?" It is necessary to patiently explain
to him that, while we would prefer it that way, the bosses will
110t permit it, will resort to violence against the majority, and
that the workers must defend themselves and their right to change
things. Our defensive formula is not only legally unassailable,
"for the jury," as our critics contemptuously remark - as though
28 indicted people in their right senses, and a party threatened with
illegality, can afford the luxury of disregarding the jury. It is
also the best formula for effective propaganda.
These defensive formulas are. not our invention; they come
directly from the great Marxists who did not believe in the good
will of the class enemies and knew how to organize action, that
is, mass action, against them. And these saqJe teachers and organizers of mass actions likewise never failed to appreciate the value
c f democratic forms and party legality and to hang onto them
and utilize them to the fullest extent possible. Our teachers did
110t shrink from force; they never deluded the workers with the
promi~e ~f a peaceful~ democratic transformation of sQciety. But
they dIdn t ~peak of VIolence always in the same way, in the same
tone and WIth the same emphasis. Always, in circumstances in
any ~ay comparable .to. ours, they have spoken as we spo~e at
the trial. Proof of thiS 15 abundant and overwhelming.
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The first formulated statement of the communist position on
the question of violence and the transition to socialism appears
in Engels' "Principles of Communism," a "catechism" written in
1847 which is generally regarded as the first draft of the Communist Manifesto. Engels wrote ~
"Question Sixte.e n: Will it be possible to bring about the abolition of private property by peaceful methods?
"Answer: It is a thing greatly to be desired, and communists
would be the last ,p ersons in the wo-rld to stand in the way of a
,p.e aceful soluti:on." (International Publishers edition of The Com,mu,n ist Manifesto, Marxist Library, Volume III, pa.ge 330.)

Engels didn't promise such a solution and he didn't forget
to add: "Should the oppressed proletariat at long last be goaded
into a revolution, the commu~ists will rally to the cause of the
workers and be just as prompt to act as they are now to speak."
The last statement of Marxist authority, expressed by Trotsky
93 , years later, follows the same pattern as that of Engels. In tlie

summer of 1940 the Dies Committee conducted a raid on a comrade's house in Texas and carried off some party literature. Anticipating an attack on the legal position of the Socialist Workers
Party, Comrade Trotsky wrote us a letter, advising us how to
formulate our propaganda and defend ourselves "from the legal
point of view" and warning us not "to ·furnish any pretext for
persecutions." This letter, as though written to answer in advance
the ultra-radical quibbling about the Minneapolis trial, was printed
in Fourth International, October 1940, page 126. Trotsky wrote:
"The Texas story is very important. The attitude of the peop.le
involved can become decisive from the le'g al point of view.
"We, of course, cannot imitate the Stalinists who proclaim, their
wbsolute devotion to the bourgeois democracy. Howev,e r, we do not
wish to furnish any pretext for ~rsecutions.
"In this case, as in any others, we should speak the truth as it
is; namely, the best, the most economical and favorable method for
the masses would be to achieve the transformation of this society by
democratic means. The democracy i·s also necessary for the organization and .education of the masses. That Is w·h y we are always
rea.dy to defend the democratic rights of the people by our own
means. However, we know on the 'b asis of tremendous historical ex'p arience that the 60 Families will never permit the democratic realization ,of socialist princf.ples. At a given moment the 60 Families
will inevitably overthrow, or try to overthrow, the democratic institutions and replace them -by a reactionary dictatorship. T·h is is what
happened in Italy, in Ger~ny and in the last days in France-not,
to mention the lesser countries. We say in advance that we are
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ready to reject such an attempt wUh arms in hands, and crush the
fascist dictatorship by a proletarian dictatorship.
"This position corr.e's'p onds to the historical r~ality an,d is juridically unattackable."

These words, written by the founder of our movement in the
last month of his life, were not chance remarks thrown off at random. They 'w ere written in direct connection with an expected
prosecution, and he specifically wa~n:d us that "the attit~de of
the people involved can become decIsive from the legal pOint of
view." He knew the value of party legality and did not want us
to jeopardize it needlessly. Do not, he said almost in so many
words, accept the prosecuting attorney's accusation that we advocate
conspiratorial violence by a minority. Present the question in a
way which "corresponds to historical reality" and which is, at
the same time, by its defensive formulation, "juridically unattackable."
That letter was the guiding line for our policy at the trial. We
took the words of Trotsky as Marxist authority. For us there is
no higher. Our movement, the movement of the Fourth International which stems directly from the struggle of the Trotskyist
Opposition in Russia since 1923, embodies in its doctrine and its
tradition the whole of Marxism and the whole of the precepts
and example of Lenin, developed and applied to conditions of
the post-Lenin period. We know it is the fashion in late years
for some people to contrast Lenin· to Trotsky and to refer to
Lenin as the primary authority. The Oehlerites in the United
States, for example, advertise themselves as "Leninists" of this
type; and even Shachtman, dabbling 'with radicalism for a season,
tried to invoke Lenin agaInst the military policy elaborated by
Trotsky. There is no more truth or merit in this burlesque than
there was in the attempt of the opportunists during the first World
War to appeal to Marx and Engels against Lenin.
All four of the great Marxist authorities - Marx, Engels,
Lenin and Trotsky - are united in an uninterrupted continuity of
experience reflected in Marxist thought. For us, Lenin is Marx
in the epoch of the first World War and the October revolution.
Trotsky is Lenin in the epoch of Stalinist degeneration and the
struggle against it, the epoch of fascism and the second W orId War
and the preparation of the new rise of the international revolution of
the proletariat.
These "Leninists" - God save the mark! - are fond of repeating isolated quotations from Lenin as fixed and final answers
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to current problems which arise ever new and in infinite variations

of circumstance. A greater distortion of Leninism _- which is a
method, not a collection of bible texts - can hardly be imagined.
They repeat the words of Lenin on this or that occasion without
understanding that Lenin did not always repeat himself and had,
nothing but contempt for such thought-saving substitutes for living
Marxism. An ' instructive sample of this practice is the attempt
of Munis to picture us as "rejecting" Lenin because we took the
liberty of saying a sentence he wrote about insurrection in Czarist
Russia in 1906 is not applicable for our propaganda in the United
States in 1941.
Our frank avowal before the court that we are disciples of
Lenin is not enough to satisfy ;Munis. Our statements that in our
nlovement "he holds a position of esteem, on a level with Marx";
that "the basic ideas and doctrines, practiced, promulgated and
carried out _by Lenin, are supported by ou~ movement" - these
declarations, in the judgment of our critic, are not sufficient to
c-onstitute an acceptance of Lenin. He seems to think it is necessary
tt.' repeat and accept as gospel every word Lenin said on every
occasion regardless of what Lenin himself may have said on the
same subj ect on other occasions.
He cites the question of Mr. Schweinhaut, the prosecutor,
reading a sentence .from -Lenin's "The Revolution of 1905": "'It
is our duty in time of an uprising to exterminate ruthlessly all
the chiefs of the civil and military authorities.' You disagr~e with
that ?"
Naturally we denied that this is a statement of party policy
here and now, modifying it as follows: "We do not agree with
the extermination of anybody unless - it is in case of an actual
armed struggle when the rules of war apply."- In reality this was
saying, out of deference to Lenin, a great deal more than needs
to be said on the subject of extermination before a capitalist court
or in a propaganda speech in the United States at the present time.
But this does not satisfy Munis. Why, he demands, ' say "anybody"
instead <?f "the civil and military chiefs"? "Why reject the para-graph ?" We must repeat Lenin word for -word!
Why must we? Lenin didn t repeat' hitnSelf word _for word.
Far from it, he changed and modified such formulas to suit occasion without ceremony. In fact, on the very eve of the October
revolution, he changed this _particular formula so radically as to
give it a quite different, "milder" meaning, in order better to serve
his political aims at the time. In his letter to the Central Co~mittee,
7
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eptember 26-27, 1917, a letter coiling for the organization
d at ed S
. any ref erence to " extermtnatIon
. . " an d
of the fnsu.,.,.ection, he omtts
s1mply says: "We must arrest the general staff and the government." (Lenin: Selected Works - Vol. VI, Page 223. Our emphasis.)
On still another occasion, September 14-16, 1917, offering. a
Hcompromise" to the S.R. and Menshevik majority, Lenin proposed
that they form an S.R.-Menshevik government responsible only to
the Soviets. Such a government, he said, "in all probability could
secure a peaceful forward march of the whole Russian Revolution." Should the proposition be accepted by. the S.R.'s and Mensheviks, then:
"No other condiUon would, I think, be advanced 'b y the Bolsheviks, who would be confident that really full fre,e dom of propaganda and the immediate realization of a new democracy in the
composition of the -Soviets (new elections to them) and in their
functioning would in themselves secur,e a pea'c eful forward movement of th~ revolution, a peac~luJ outcome of the party strike within
the Soviets.
"Perhaps this is already impossible? Perhaps. But if ther.e is
even one chance in a hundred, the attempt at realizing such a possibility would still be worth while." ('L enin: Collected Works, Vo1. XXI,
Book I, Pages 153-154.)

In this case Lenin asked nothing more of the "civil and
military chiefs" among the "ruling" petty-bourgeois democratic
parties than that they take power and assure "really full freedom
of propaganda." Returning to this question again on ' October 9,
1917, he wrote:
"Our business is to help do everything possible to secure the
'last' chance for a peaceful development of the revolution, to help
this by !p resenting our programme, by making clear its general, national character, its a'b solute harmony with the inter,e sts and demands
of an enormous 'm ajority 'o f th~ population." (Lenin: Collected Works.
-Vol. XXI, Book I, Pa'g e 257.)

Thus, Lenin proposed .to fight "the civil and military chiefs'"
in three different ways, according to the circumstances, on three
different occasions - by "extermination," by "arrest," ,and bv
"peaceful propaganda." All were equally revolutionary. The o~
casions and the circumstances in each case were different. Lenin
took. such variations into account and changed his proposals accordingly. He never made a strait-jacket out of his tactical for-:mulas. N either should ' we - if we want to be genuine Leninists.
That "force is the midwife o~ every old society pregnant with
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the new" - this is an axiom known to every student of Marxism.
It is wrong, to entertain or disseminate illusions on this score, and
we did not do so at the trial. But it is a great mistake to conclude
from this that violence and the talk about violence serve the revolutionary vanguard advantageously at all times and under all conditions. On the contrary, peaceful conditions and democratic legal
forms are most useful in the period when the party is still gathering its forces and when the main strength and resources, including
the resources of violence, are on the other side. Lenin remarked
that Engels was "most correct" in "advocating the use of bourgeois
legality" and saying to the German ruling class in 1891: "Be the
first to shoot, Messrs. Bourgeois!"
Our party 'which must still strive to get a hearitng frolll the
as yet indifferent working class of America has the least reason
of all to emphasize or to "advocate" violence. This attitude is
determined by the present stage of class development and the relation of forces in the United States; not, as M unis so generously
assumes, by our exaggerated concern for a "light sentence." As
a matter of fact the question of violence was giv~n ten times more
proportionate mention in our testimony at the trial than it has
been given in the propaganda columns of our press during the
past ten years, including the voluminous contributions of Conlrade
l"rotsky.
Expressing disdain for our repeated painstaking explanations
"about who initiates the violence," and our "general tone" which,
he says, "makes one feel embarrassed at times," M unis offers us
"proud valor"- as a substitute. Had we been gifted with this rare
attribute we should have said, according to Munis: "The workers
and farmers should respond to the daily violence of the poor masses. We do not predict, but rather 'we assure, we ask, we advocate
temporary violence of the majority against the permanent organic
'Violence of the reactionary minority."
We don't know much about "proud valor" and had no need
J()f it; we did not appear at the trials as posturing actors but only
;as party' militants with a practical political task to carry out. N aturally, it is a good thing for a revolutionary militant to have
()rdinary human courage enough to take those risks which are
implicit in the struggle against capitalism. And we can add: He
should also have enough prudence to avoid unnecessary sacrifices.
The lack of either of these qualities can be a serious personal deficiency. .But the posses~ion of both, and in good working order
at that, sttll does not suffice to answer the most important questiol!
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formulations,
con f ront lng
us at the trial'" namely what
.
b what tone,
·
on
the
question
of
Violence
could
esth
serve'our
w h at emphaSlS
..
_
ulven condItIons? The answer to t e questIon
cause un der the b·
must be political, not theatrical.
. . .
..
L nin unquestionably burned WIth IndIgnatIon and hatred for
the op~ressions of the people and ~new about the ,:iole~ce of all
kinds that is inse?arabl~ from a regtme ?,f c1as,~ domInatIon .. Also,
while it is quite ImpossIble to s~eak of valor t? say nothIng; of
"proud valor," in connect~on WIth th~ unpretentIous an? m.atterof-fact Lenin - such knIghtly grandIloquence would fIt hIm as
oddly as a silk hat - there _is evidence. that he had ner:e e.nough
to fill his post. Lenin 'was the most stIff-necked rebel In hIstory.
But his approach to the question of violence, as to every other
question, was determined by political considerations. He did not
by any means employ one universal formula and one kind of emphasis such as M unis prescribes for us. Indeed, he was far less
"radical" in his formulations for the propaganda of the Bolshevik
party in the months, and even the weeks, directly preceding the
victory than is Munis in his demands on our party which at the
time of the trial could only be described properly as a small and
isolated propaganda group.
It is most revealing to read how the great master of revolutionary strategy, returning to Russia after the March revolution,
developed the work of mobilizing the masses around the Bolshevik
party by means of propaganda. The Bolshevik party grew by leaps
and bounds, but nevertheless remained a minority for many months.
It should be instructive to any "violence" fanatic to see how Lenin,
under these conditions, persistently tried to shove the question. of
violence into the background and to ward off a premature test
of strength. Even as late as October 9, as we have seen, he was
offering "to help do everything possible to secure the 'last' chance
for a peaceful development of the revolution." When he finally
called for action it was for mass action and there was no theatrical
bluster about it. The Bolshevik party, thanks to its preliminary
prop~ganda work, had the mass force to carry the action through
to VIctory.
On Apri125 he protested in Pravda against "dark insinuations"
of "Minister N ekrasov" about "the preaching of violence" by the
Bolsheviks:
"Mr. Minister. worthy mem·ber of the 'People's Freedom Party'
you are lying. It is Mr. Guchkov who pr,e aches violence when h~
threatens to pUnish the soIdier~ for removing the authorities. It
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is the Russkaia Valia, the pogrom newspaper of the pogrom 'republicans' and friendly to you that preaches violence.
"The Pravda and its followers do not preach violence. On
the contrary, they declare most clearly, precisely, and derinitely,
that our main work should at present he concentrated on e:cplaining
to the -p roletarian masses their 'p roletarian 'Problems, as distinguished
from the problem-s of the petty bourgeoisie which has succumbed
to -chauvinist poison." (Lenin: Collected Works - Vol. xx, Book 1,
Page 171.)

On May 4 the Central Committee of the party adopted a reso ..
lution written by Lenin. The aim of this resolution was to restrain
the Petrog,r ad local leadership 'which was running ahead of events;
to put the ((responsibilityJ) for any violence on the "Provisional
Government and its supporters"; and to accuse the "capitalist minority" of reluctance to submit to the will of the majority." Here
are the two paragraphs from the resolution:
'"'I. Party agitators and s.p eakers must refute the despicable
lies of the capitalist -p apers and of the papers supporting the
capitalists t-o the effect that we threaten with civil wa,.. This Is
a despicable lie, for at the 'present moment, when the ca.pitaUsta
and their government cannot and dare not use violence against
the masses, when the mass of soldiers and workers freely expr.e sses its will, freely elects and replaces all pu1>lic ofricers, - at
such a moment any thought of civil war is naive, senseless, mon·
strous; at such a moment there ·m ust be full compliance with the
will of the majority of the population ' and free criticism . of this
will by the dissatisfied minority; should violence be resorted to,
the responsibility will fall on the Provisional Government and its
supporters.
"2. The government of the capitalists and its newspapers, by
their noisy denunciation of the alleged civil war, are only trying
to conceal the reluctance of the capitalists, who admittedly constitute an insignifieant minority of the t)eOlple, to submit to the
will of t-h e majority." ('L enin: Collected Works - Vol. XX, Book 1,
:Page 245.)

Doesn't this sound surprisingly like "the lamentable dialogue
(lbout who initiates the violence" concerning which Munis so haughtily protests? Indeed, the similarity is not accidental. Our formulations did not fall from the sky. We had taken the trouble to read
Lenin, not in order to memorize his words bu.t to learn the essence
of his methods of approaching and mobilizing the masses while
the Bolsheviks remained in the minority.
On May 5 the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party, fighting against enemy provocations on the one side and revolutionary
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impatience in ~e part~ ranks ~n the other, .adopted anoth~r r~so
lution on LenIn's motIon. It IS 'worth readIng over ten tImes by
any comrade who may be impressed by light-~ind~d talk about
"action" by a party which lacks the necessary mass support for
action. The resolution says:
"The slogan, "Down with the Provisional Government,' .is at
the vresent moment not sDund, 'because such a slogan, unless there
is a solid (Le., a class conscious and organized) m,a jority of the
people on the side of the revolutionary proletariat, is either a mere
phrase, or, objectively, reduces itself to encouraging efforts of an
adventurous nature." (Lenin: Collected Works - Vol. XX, Book 1,
Page 254.)

If these ideas are correct, and we believe they are, then it is
certainly reasonable to conclude that the Socialist Workers Party
in the United States has some long., hard days of propaganda work,
of patiently explaining, ahead of it. By such means ·it must secure
a mass support before it can afford the luxury of much talk about
action. Lenin drew these conclusions for the Bolshevik party, and
laid down precise instructions accordingly, only six months befo-r e
it was to become the majority. The same resolution says in another
paragraph:
"The slogans of the moment ar,e : (1) El~cidation of the proletarian 'p olicy and proletarian method of terminating the war; (2)
criticisrn of the petty-bourgeois policy of confidence in and agreement with the capitalist government; (3) propaganda and agitation
from group to group, within each regiment, in each .factory, particularly amongst the most backward masses, servants, unskilled
labourers, etc., for it is mostly on them that the bourgeoisie tried
to 'base itself during the days of the crisis; (4) organisation, organisation and once mMe organi8(1,tion of the prDl,etariat: in each
factory, in each district, in each block." (Lenin: Colleeted worksVol. XX, Book 1, Page 255. Our emphasis.)

On May 6, still hammering at irresponsible violence-mongers,
the greatest leader of revolutionary action, who believed in fi'r st
U explaining" and ((convincing" and (''Winning over the tnajority/'
wrote:
"Crises cannot be overcome by the violence of individuals
against other individuals, by partial ri-sings of small groups of
armed -people, 'b y Blanquist attempts to 'seize power,' to 'arrest'
the Provisional Government, etc.
"The slogan of the day is: Explain more carefully, more clearly,
more broadly the proletarian poUcy, the proletarian method of
terminating the war." (L.e nin: Collected Wor,k s - Vo1. XX, Book 1,
Pape 259.)

Marxism, without a doubt, is the doctrine of revolutionary ac-
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tion. But is has nothing. in common with "violence of individuals/'
"partial risings of small groups," or any other form of "action"
wherein individuals or minorities attempt to substitute themselves
for the masses. In other words Marxism is not anarchism or Blanquism ,; it wages irreconcilable war against such tendencies. The
revolutionary action which Marxism contemplates is the action of
the masses, of the proletarian majority, led by the vanguard party.
But this action, and the party's leading role in it must be, and can
only be, prepared by propaganda. That is the central lesson of the
development of the Bolshevik party after the March revolution and
the eventual transformation of its slogans from propaganda to
action. That was Lenin's method. It was less romantic than that
of impatient people who dream of short cuts and miracles to be
evoked by the magic word "action." But, in compensation, Lenin's
method led to a mighty and victorious mass action in the end.
A party which lacks a mass base, which has yet to become
widely known to the workers, must approach them along the lines
of propaganda, of patient explanations, and pay no attention to
impatient demands for "action" which it is unable to organize and
for exaggerated emphasis on "violence" which, in the given conditions, ,can only react to its disadvantage. When one considers
how persistently careful and even cautious~ was Lenin's party to
avoid provocation and cling to its formula of peaceful prO'paganda
while it remained a minority, the merest suggestion that our party,
at the present time, with its present strength, take a "bolder" course
appears utterly fantastic, like a nightmare separated from living
reality. Lenin wrote:
''The government would Uke to- see us make the first reckless
step towards decisive action, as this would be to its advantage. It
is ,e xasperated because our party has advanced the slogan of peaceful demonstration. We must not cede one iota of our princivles to
the watchfully waiting petty ,b ourgeoisie. The proletarian party
would -be guilty of th~ most grieVious error if it shaped its policy on
the -b asis of subJective desires where organisation is required. We
cannot assert that the majority is with us; in this .case our motto
should be: caution, caution, caution." (Lenin: Collected Works Vol. XX, Book 1, Page 279.)

From the foregoing it should be clear that our disavowal of
for violence in the testimony before the court at
Minneapolis was not a special device invented by us "to reconcile
the jury," as has been alleged; our formulation of the question,
taken from Lenin, was designed to serve the political aims of our
movement in the given situation. We did not, and had no need to,
'~responsibility"
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disregard legality and "advocate" violence as charged in the Indictment.
But neither did we represent ourselves as pacifists or sow
pacifist illusions. Far from it. We. elucidate~ the. question of violence and the socialist transformatIon of sqc1ety In the same way
that our great teachers, who organized a revolution, elucidated it.
More than that, we gave a sufficiently frank and precise justification of the defensive violence of the workers in the daily class
struggle this side of the revolution. The court record bulges with
proof that we had indeed advocated the organization of Workers
Defense Guards. The testimony goes further-and this is a not
unimportant detail - and reveals that we translated the word into
deed and took a hand in the actual organization and activities of
Defense Guards and picket squads when concrete circumstance
made such actions possible and feasible.
We are not pacifists. The world knows, and the prosecutor in
our trial had no difficulty in proving once again, that the great
I\1inneapolis strikes, led by the Trotskyists, were not free fronl
violence and that the workers were not the only victims. We did
not disavow the record or apologize for it. When the prosecutor,
referring to one of the strike battles in which the workers came
out victorious, demanded: "Is that Trotskyism demonstrating itself?" he received a forthright answer. The court record states:l
"A: Well, I can give you my own opinion, that I am mighty
proud of the fact that Trotskyism had some part in influencing the
workers to protect thems.elves against that sort of violence.
"Q: Well, what kind of violence do you mean?
irA: This was what the deputies were organized for, to drive
the workers off the street. They got a · dose of their own medicine.
I think the workers have a right to defend themselves. ' If tha.t
is treason, you can make the most of it." (.S ocialism on Trial, Page
113.)

With this testimony we said all that needs to be said on the
question of violence in ~he daily class struggle, as in the previously
quoted testimony we said enough about violence and the transition
to socialism. I f this method of presentation did not help the prosecutor, we can say again: That was not our duty. If it is objected
that. even. in this example of the Minneapolis strike, dealing; with
an IndubItable case of working-class violence we insisted on its
defensive nature, we can only reply: In reai life the difference
bet:ve~,n . careful de~ensive formulation and light-minded "calls for
act~on IS usually, 1n the end result, the difference between real
actton and mere talk about it.
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4. Is It Correct to Say We Prefer a Peaceful
Transition?
Our repeated insistence at the trial that we prefer a peaceful
transition to socialism, and that we resort to violence only as a
defensive measure, brings objection and ridicule from our critic.
HWhy not," says Munis - "why not ask forgiveness, besides, for
seeing ourselves painfully obliged to employ violence against the
bourgeoisie?" It is possible that others may regard our formulation
as lacking in aggressiveness and militancy but, being; more indulgent
than Munis, pass it off as a legal euphemism, justifiable under the
circumstances. To be sure, our formulation helped our position
from a legal standpoint and we did not hesitate to emphasize it in
this respect. Also, in our opinion, the declaration that we, the
rrrotskyists, prefer a peaceful change of society, is a good propaganda approach to the democratic-minded American workers.
These two considerations are very important, but we are quite
ready to agree that they would not justify the use of a false or
hypocritical statement, or a statenlent contradicting principle.
We were guilty of no such dereliction. Our formula in this
case also is the formula of the Marxisf teachers. They not only
insisted on the desirability of a peaceful change of society, but in
certain exceptional circumstances, considered such a peaceful revolution possible. We, on our part, rejected any such prospect in the
United States, but at the same time declared our preference for it
and accused the ruling: bourgeois as the instigators of violence. In
this we were completely loyal to Marxist doctrine and tradition.
On the witness stand at Minneapolis we mentioned the opinio'~ of
~1arx and Engels in regard to England in the 19th century. Here
is the exact quotation from Engels:
'~Surely, at such a moment, the voice ought to be heard of a
man whose whole theory is the result of a life-long study of the
economic 'h istory and condition of England, and whom that study
led to the conclusion that, at least in Europe, England is the only
country where the inevitable social revolution might be effected
entirely by peaoeeful and legal means. He certainly never forgot to
add that he hardly expected the English ruling class,es to submit,
without a 'pro-slavery r,e bellion,' to this peaceful and legal revolu·
tion." (Engels: Preface to Marx's Capital, Vol. I - Kerr Edition,
Page .32.)

We should have added that the conditions of England in
Marx's time exist no more and therewith his calculation is out of
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date and no longer applicable. At any rate, we made this clear
with regard to the United States.."
.
.
In "Terrorism and CommunIsm, a book aImed from begInning to end at the bourgeois-democratic fetishism of Kautsky, Trotsky defended the violence of the proletarian revolution as a weapon
forced upon it by the violence of the counter-revolutionary bour..:.
geoisie; never did he renounce a preference for the peaceful way.
In his introduction to the Second English Edition, published in
England under the publishers' title, "In Defense of Terrorism,'"
he explains the position as follows:
"From the Fabians we may hear it objected that the English
proletariat have it quite in their own hands to come to power by
way of Parliament, to carry through peacefully, within the law and
step by step, all the changes called for in the ea.pitaUst system, and
by so doing not only to mak.e revolutionary terrorism needless, but
also to dig the ground away under the feet of counter-revolutionary
adventurers. An outIo-o k such as this has at first sight a particular
persuasiveness in the light of the -L abour Party's very important
successes in the elections - ,b ut only at first sight, and that a
very superficial one. The Fabian hope must, 1 fear, be held from
the very beginning to be out of the question. 1 say '1 fear,' ,inoe
a peaceful, parliamentary change over to a new social !tructu,..
would. undoubtedly offer highly iwportant aavantages from t'Ne
standpoint of the interests of culture, and therefore those of .0cialism. But in politics nothing is more dangerous than to mistake
what we wish for what is possible." (Trotsky: Introduction to

Second English Edition of "In Defense of Terrorism," Page v. Our
emphasis.)

We tried to say the same thing at the trial in our own words
and in our own way, suited to the circumstances. 1n this classic
formulation of the question, the legal and propagandistic advantages of our "preference for a peaceful transition" fall into their
proper place beside, and subordinate to, the most weighty considerations of all: "The interests of culture, and therefore those of
'socialism.' ,
, Trotsky, again, in his introduction to the book on "The Living
'1 houghts of 1VIarx," foretold a violent revolution for the United
States, but he did not neglect to place the blame on the ruling class
and express a different preference. Said Trotsky:
"It would be best, of cours,e, to achieve this purpose in a peaceful, gradual democratic way. But the social order that has outlived
itself never yields its 'place to its successor without r~sistance."
(Page 33.)

Lenin, as has been shown heretofore, denied the accusations
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of Bolshevik responsibility for violence so often that more than
one critic of that revolutionary time, 'sick with radicalism and impatient for "action," might well have reproached him for the "euphemistic, sweetened character" of his statements and taunted him
with the ironical query: "Why not ask forgiveness, besides?" However that may be, Lenin, preparing the greatest mass action in
history by means of propaganda, insisted right up to the end that
be preferred the peaceful road.
On October 9-10 he promised support to the Soviets "in every
way" if they would but assume power and thus secure a peaceful
development:
"Th,e proletariat will stop before no sacrifices to save the revolution, which is impossible without the programme set forth above.
On the other hand, the proletariat would support the Soviets in
every way if they were to make use of their last chance for securing
a peaceful development of the revolution." ('Lenin: Collected Works
- Vol. XXI, Book 1, Page 264.)

In the same article he maintained that even at that late day
the Soviets had the possibility - "probably their last chance" - to
secure a peacef~l development:
uHavin·g seized 'Power, the Soviet could still at pres.e nt - and
this is probably their last chance - secure a peaceful development
of the revolution, 'p eaceful ,e lections of th~ deputies -b y the people,
a peaceful struggle of parties inside of the Soviets, a testing of
the programmes of various parties in practice, a peaceful passin-g
of lpower from one -p arty to another." (Lenin: Collected Works Vol. XXI, Book 1, Pages 26-3-264.)

As late as September 29 he contended that in Russia, under

the unique conditions which he cited, "an exceptional historic moment," a peaceful transformation was even probahle:
"The 'Peaceful development of any revolution is, generally speaking, .a n extremely rare and difficult thing, for a Tevolution is the
maximum sharpening of the sharpest class contradictions; but in
a peasant country at a time when a union of the ;p roletariat with
the peasantry ron give peace to the masses that are worn out b,.
a most unjust and criminal war, when such a union can give the
peasantry all the land, in such a -country, at such an ~xceptional
historic moment, a peaceful development of the revolution is possible
and probable if all power !passes to the Soviets. Within the Soviets
the struggle of parties for power may 'Proceed peacefully, with the
Soviets fully democratised, with 'petty thefts' and defrauding of
democratic principles eliminated - such as giving the soldiers. one
representative to eyery five hundred, while the workers have one
representative t<> every thousand voters. In a democratic republic
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such petty thefts are doomed to disappear."
Works - Vol. XXI, Book 1, Pages 237-23'8.)

(Len"ln:

Collected

Trotsky, in his "History," has explained this strategy of the
Bolsheviks which was untainted by the fetishism of violence:
"The transfer of power to the soviets meant, in its immed1&te
sense, a transfer of lpower to the Compromis,e rs. That might have
been accomplished peacefully, by way of a sim'Ple dismissal of the
bourgeois government, whiehhad survived only on the good will
of the Compromisers and the relics of the confidence in them of
the .m asses. The dictatorship of the workers and soldiers had been
a fact ever since the 27th of February. But the workers and soldiers
wer,e not to the point necessary aware of that fact. They had confided the power to the Compromisers, who in their turn had passed
it over to the ,b ourgeoisie. The calculations of the Bolsheviks on
a peaceful development of the revolution rested, not .on the hope
that the bourgeoisie would v:oluntarily turn over the ·p ower to. the
workers and soldiers, but that the workers and soldiers would in
good season prevent the eompromisers fro·m surrendering the power
to the bourgeoisie.
"The concentration of th~ 'power in the soviets under a regime
of soviet democracy, would have opened ,b efore the Bolsheviks a
complete opportunity to become a majority in the soviet, and consequently to create a government on the ·b asis of their program.
For this end an armed insurrection would have 'been unnecessary.
The interchange of ,p ower between parties could have been accomplished peacefully. All the efforts of the party from April to July
had be,e n directed towards making possible a peaceful development
of the revolution through the soviet. 'Patiently explain' - that
had been the key to the Bolshevik ,p olicy." (Trotsky: History of
the Russian Revolution - Vol. II, Pages 312-3'13.)

These words of the two greatest leaders of Marxism in action
should have an instructive value for all revolutionary militants.
Lenin's sincere and earnest talk about a "peaceful development of
the revolution"; his offer to "make compromises" to assure "the
la.st chance" for it; Trotsky's summary statement that the "key
to the Bolshevik policy" had been the simple prescription: "patiently explain" - in all this it is shown that Lenin and Trotsky were
completely free from radical bombast about violence. But in return, they organized a victorious proletarian revolution.
And they had prepared so well that the transfer of power did
.
Indee~ take place in Petrograd without any large-scale violence.
We dId not falsify the historical fact at the trial when we said
there was "just a little scuffling., that's all." (Socialism on Trial,
Page 64.) The violence came afterward, initiated by the "pro39

slavery .rebellion" which was eventually crushed by the m~ss force
of the people led by the .Bolshevik party. These impressive facts
give the explanations and formulas of Lenin and Trot~ky a certain
authority for those who want to be Marxists.

5. "Submitting to the Majority"
Comrade M unis is dissatisfied with our assertions at the trial
that "we submit to the majority." The Oehlerites also are scornful
of this declaration and represent it as some kind of capitulatory
repudiation of our principles in order to impress the jury. All
these assumptions are without foundation. Our "submission to the
li1ajority" was not first revealed at the trial. We said it before
the trial and continue to repeat it after the trial. It is a correct
statement of our position because it conforms both to reality and
necessity. Moreover, our Marxist teachers said it before us; we
learned it from them.
What else can we do but "submit to the majority" if we are
Marxists, and not Blanquists or anarchist muddle-heads? It is
a timely occasion to probe into this question because we believe
any . ill-considered talk about some kind of mysterious "action,"
presumed to be open to us while we remain not only a minority,
but a very small, numerically insignificant minority, can lead only
to a dang.erous disorientation of the party. An exposition of the
Marxist position on this question can also be useful as an antidote
for any remnants of the half-Blanquist tradition of the early years
of the Comintem in America.
The pioneer communists in the United States (and not only
here) heard of the Bolshevik victory 'in Russia long before they
learned about the political method and propaganda techniques
vvhereby the Bolsheviks gained the mass support which made the
seizure of power possible. Their first impressions were undoubtedly colored by the capitalist press accounts which represented the
revolution as a coup If etat engineered by a small group. This distorted conception was epitomized by the title given to the American
edition of Trotsky's classic pamphlet, "Terrorism and Communism," which was published here by the party's publishing house in
1922 under the completely misleading title: "Dictatorship versus
Democracy ." We took the "dictatorship," so to speak, and generously handed over to the bourgeoisie all claim to "democracy."
This was far too big a concession, perhaps pardonable in a
young: movement lacking adequate knowledge about the democratic
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essence .of the Bolshevik ·program, but by far out "of date to4ay.
The bourgeoisie have always trie~ to picture communi$m as. ~
" criminal conspiracy'~ in order to alienate the worker~ ~ho are
profoundly "democratic i? th~ir sentiments. That was the ~im . onc.~
again in the Minneapohs trIal. It was our task ~t . ~he tr~al to go
Gut of our way to refute this misrepresentation and emphasize the
democratic basis of our program; ~ot in order to placate our eneInies and persecutors, as is assumed, but in order to reveal th~
truth to our friends, the American workers.
"
We cannot eat our cake and have it too. We must either "subnlit" to the majority and confine ourselves to propaganda designed
to win over the majority - or, we must seize power, more correctly, try to seize power and break the neck of the party, by minority
"action."
Marxist authority is clear and conclusive in choosing between
these alternatives. When we ' took our stand in court regarding
"submission" to the majority we were not "folding our arms" and
making; "opportunistic" statements of "passivity in the face of the
Imperialist war," as we are accused. Nothing of the sort. The
testimony states, repeatedly, and with sufficient emphasis, that,
while "submitting to the majority" - that is, making no minority
insurrections or putsches - we are organizing, speaking, writing~
and "explaining"; in other words, carrying on propaganda with
the object of winning over the majority to our prog.ram, which is
the program of social revolution.
N either were we simply trying t9 "make an honorable impression on the jury without taking into consideration that we
should talk for the masses." .To be sure we did not stupidly
disregard the jury which held the fate of 28 comrades, not to
rr.lention the legality of the party, in its hands. But we were speaking also, and especially, "for the masses." We testified primarily
for publication. It was our deliberate aim to convince those who.
would read the testimony in printed form of the truth that the
proletarian movement which we aspire' to lead is a democratic
nlovement, and not a "conspiracy," as the prosecutor and the whole
vf the capitalist press would picture it, and as loose talkers would
unconsciously aid them to so picture it; not a scheme to transfer
~ower ~rom one clique to. another, but a movement of the majority
In the Interest of the majority.
"
In additi?n, it may as. well be said candidly that this testimony
V';-as also delIberately deSIgned as an educational shock to such
members and sympathizers of our movement as may still, at this
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late day, be dabbling with the idea of a shorter cut to socialism by
some mysterious prescription for "action."
The Marxist authorities have all spoken in one voice on this
question.
The Cotnmunist Manifesto, the first, and the most fundamental statement of the principles of scientific socialism, defined the
proletarian movement of emancipation, in contradistinction to all
others in history, as follows:
"All !previous historical movements w.e re movements of minorities,
or in the interest of minorities. The 'p roletarian movement is the
self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in
the interest of the immense majority."

The communist political method and strategy follow ineluctably from this basic premise. Nowhere and never have the authoritative representatives of Marxism formulated the question otherwise. The Marxists aim to make the social transformation UJith
the majority and not for the majority. The irreconcilable struggle
of Marx and Engels against the Blanquists revolved around this
pivot.
In 1895, summing up the experience of fifty years, Engels
Vlrote, in his Introduction to Marx' "Class Struggles in France":
."The time of surprise attaiCks, of revolutions carried through by
small conscious minorities at th.e head of the unconscious mas·ses, is
,p ast. Where it is a question of a complete transformation of th.e
social organisations, the masses themselves. must also be in it, must
themselves already have gras'ped what is at stak,e, :what they are
·g oing in !for (with body ana soul). The history of the last fifty years
has taught Us that." (The Class Struggles in France, by Karl MarxMarxist Library, Vol. XXIV, Page 25).

The successors of Marx and Engels followed in their footsteps. The experiences of the Russian revolution confirmed in life
the basic premise of the founders of scientific socialism. It was
precisely because Lenin and Trotsky had assimilated this concept
into their flesh and blood that they knew how to concentrate their
whole activity on propaganda to 'Win over the majority, biding their
time till they gained the majority, and resorting to "action" only
.;when they felt assured of the support of the majority.
What did they do in the meantime? They u sub1nitted to the
majority/' What else could they do? Lenin explained it a hundred
times, precisely in those months and days when the Bolsheviks
were consciously preparing the struggle for power. In his "April
Theses" on "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revo-
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lution," published in Pravda on April 20, 1917, a few days after
his return to Russia, Lenin wrote:
"As long as we are in the mInority we carryon the work of criticising and exposing errors and at the same time advocate the necessity
of transferring the entire power of state to the Soviets of WorkeTIS'
Deputies, so that the masses may 'b y experience overcome their
mistakes." (Lenin: Selected Works-Vol. V[, Page 23.)
A few days later, he returned to this q~estion, explaining the

reason for this attitude, the reason being that "we are not Blanquists, we are Marxists." On April 22 he wrote:
"In order to obtain the power of state the class conscious workers
must win the majority to their side. .As l()ng as no viQlence is used
against the masses, there is no 'Other road to power. We ar,e not
Blanquists, we are not in favour of the seizure of power ,b y a minority. We are Marxists, we stand tfor a ipl"oletarian class struggle
against chauvinist def,encism., llhr3iSes, and dependence on the
bourgeoisie." (Lenin: Selected Works-Vol. VI, Page 29.)

Not once or twice, but repeatedly and almost continually, so
that neither friend nor foe could possibly misunderstand him,
in the months directly preceding the ' October revolution, Lenin
limited the Bolshevik task to the propaganda work of "criticizing,"
uexposing. errors" and "advocating" in order to "win the majority
to their side." This was not camouflage for the enemy but education for the workers' vanguard. He explained it theoretically
a s we, following him, tried to explain it in popular language at
the trial.
Again, in April 1917, refuting the accusations of Plekhanov
and others who accused the Bolsheviks of "anarchism, Blanquism,
and so forth," Lenin once again explained the question, for the
benefit, as he said, of "those who really want to think and learn."
Into a few paragraphs he compresses a profound thesis which
every member of the workers' vanguard ought to learn by heart.
He wrote:
"I a'b solutely insured myself in my theses against skipping over the
still existing peasant m'ov,e ment, or the ,p etty-bourgeois movement in
general, against the workers' government playing at the 'seizure ot
power,' against any kind of Blanquist adventurism; for I directly
referred to the experience of the Paris Commune. And this experience, as we know, and as was shown in detail by Marx ,i n 1871 and
by Engels in 1891J absolutely excluded Blanquism, absolutely ensur~d
the direct, immediate and unconditional rule of the majority and
the activity of the masses, but only to the extent of the oonscious and
intelligent action of the majority itself.
"In the theses I definitely redu~d the question to one of a strug·
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gle for influen.ce within the 'Soviets of Workers' Agricultural La·

bourers', Soldiers' and Peasants' 'D eputies. In order to leave no trace
of doubt in this respect, I twice 8IIl1Phasized in the theses the necessity
for patient and ~rsistent 'explanatory' work 'adapted to the practical needs of the 'mJ(],8ses.'

"Ignorant persons or renegades from Marxism, such as Mr. Plekhanov, may cry anarchism, Blanquism, and so forth. 'B ut those who
really want to think and learn cannot fail to understand that Blanquis·m means the seizure of power by a minority, wh,e reas the Soviet
of Workers', A:gricultural Labourers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies
are admittedly the direct and immediate organisation of the majorit1l
of the 'P,eople. Work confined to a struggle for influence within
these Soviets cannot, absolutely cannot, blunder into the swamp of
Blanquism. Nor can it ,b lunder into the swamp of anarchism., for
anarchism denies the necessity for a state and. jor state power in the
period of transition from the rule of the bourgeoisie to the rule of the
'p roletariat, whereas I, with a precision that excludes all possibility of
misunderstanding, insist on the necessity for a state in this period,
although, in accordance with Marx and the experience of t~e Paris
Commune, not the usual parliamentary bourgeois state, but a state
without a standing army, without a police opposed to the people,
without an officialdom placed above the people." (Lenin: Selected
Works-Vol. VI, Pages 37-38.)

Again explaining wherein "Marxism differs from Blanquism"
-he obviously considered it absolutely necessary for the advanced
workers to understand this so as to be sure of their ground at
every step-he wrote in a letter to the Central Committee of the
party on September 26-27, 1917:
"To be successful, the uprising must be based not on a conspiracy,
not on a party, :b ut on the advanced class. This is the first point.
The uprising must be based on the revolutionary upsurge of the
people. This is the second !point. The uprising must be based on the
crucial point in the history of the maturing revolUtion, when the,
activity of the vanguard of the people is at its height, When the
vacillations in the ranks of the enemies, and in the ranks of the weak,
half-hearted, undecided friends 01 the revolution are at their highest
point. This is the third point. It is in pointing out thes,e three

conditions as the way of approaching the question of an uprising,
that Marxism differs from Blanquism." (Lenin: Collected WorksVol. XXI, Bo~k 1, Page 224.)

Naturally, when Lenin, or any other Marxist, spoke of the
necessity of the revolutionary party having the support of the
majority he meant the real majority whose sentiments are ascertainable in various ways besides the ballot box of the bourgeois
state. On the eve of the insurrection he wrote his ' devastating
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ttack on Zinoviev and Kamenev who opposed the insurrection
the ground, among other things, that "we do not enj~:>: a ~ajor
ity among the people, and in the absence of that conditlon Insurrection is hopeless."
Lenin, in "A Letter to the Comrades," written on October
29-30 scornfully dismissed the authors of this statement as "either
distorters of the truth or pedants who desire at all costs, without
the slightest regard for the true circumstances of the revolution,
to have a guarantee in advance that the Bolshevik Party throughout
the country has received exactly one half the number of votes
plus one." Nevertheless, he took pains to prove the Bolsheviks
had the majority by "facts": "The elections of August 20 in Petrograd". .. "The elections to the Borough Dumas in Moscow in
'
. " . . "The maSeptember". . . "Th e new eI
ectlons
to t h e S OVIets.
jority of the Peasants' Soviets" who had "expressed their opposition to the coalition"... "The mass of the soldiers". . . "Finally ... the revolt of the peasantry." He concluded his argument
on this point by saying: "No, to doubt now that the majority
cf the people are following and will follow the Bolsheviks is
shameful vacillation."
Once again disavowing Blanquism, he wrote in his polemic
>2.gainst Zinoviev and Kamenev:
"A military conspiracy is Blanquism it it is not organized 'by the
party of a definite class; it itS' organizers have not reekoned with the
poUtical situation in general and the international situation in particular; 't the party in question does not enjoy the sympathy of thp
majority of the people, as proved by definite facts. . . ." (Lenin: Selected Works-Vol. VI, Pages 321-322.)

On September 25-27 Lenin called upon the Bolshevik party
to take power. In this famous letter, addressed "to the Central
,Committee, the Petrograd and Moscow Committees of the Russian
Social-Democratic Labor Party," Lenin, with the logic and direct,pess which characterized him, states his premise and his conclusion
in the first sentence:
.
"Having obtained a majority in the Soviets of W.()rkers' and{ Sol..
diers' Deputies of both capitals, the Bolsheviks can and must take
power into their hands."

He was not worried about a "formal" majority; "no revolution . ev~r waits for this.}} But he was sure of the real majority.
He InsIsted upon the revolution "right now," as he expressed it,
not sooner and not later, because:
"The majority of the people is with us. This has 'been proven by
the long and difficult road from May 19 to August 12 and September
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2·5: the majority in' the Soviets of the capitals is the result of the
people's \progress to our siae. The vacillation of the Socialist-RevolutionarLes and Mensheviks, and the strengthening of internationalists
among them, is proof of the same thing." (Lenin: Collected WorksVol. XXI, Book 1, Page 221.)

The prosecution. at the Minneapolis trial attempted to convict
us, as charged in the indictment, of an actual "conspiracy to overthrow the government by force and violence." We successfully
refuted this accusation, and the indictment covering this point
was rejected by the jury. The most effective element of our refntation of this absurd charge against our small party was our
exposition of the democratic basis of the proletarian program,
of the party's reliance on the majority to realize its program, and
its corresponding obligation, while it remains in the minority, to
"submit to the majority." In making this exposition we had a
legal purpose, but not only a legal purpose, in mind. As with all
the testimony, it was designed primarily to explain and simplify
'o ur views and aims to the workers who would be future readers
of the published court record.
We also thought a restatement of the Marxist position in this
respect would not be wasted on the members of our own movement,
and might even be needed. The discussion which has arisen on
this question only proves that we were more correct in this latter
assumption than we realized at the time. Socialism is a democratic
movement and its program, the program of the vanguard party,
can be realized only with the support of the majority. The party's
basic task, while it remains in the minority, is "propaganda to
win over the majority." To state this was not capitulation to the
prejudices of the jury; it is the teaching of Marx and Lenin, as
has been shown in the foregoing references.

6. Marxism and War
Our insistence at the trial that we undertake revolutionary
action only with the support of the majority and not over their
heads has brought a criticism also in connection with our attitude
toward war, but this criticism is no more valid than the others and
has no more right to appeal to the authority of Lenin.
Comrade M unis quotes with sharp disapproval the following
answer to a hypothetical question concerning what our attitude
would be in the event of the United States entering the war (this
was before the declaration of war) :
"A decision has been made, and is aecepted by the majority of the
people, to go to war. Our comrades have to comply with that."
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Mums widens the gap between his understanding of revolutionary policy and ours by strongly o~ecting to this, as it appears
to us, obviously correct and necessary statement. H .e says:
"1:'n t~ first place, the d·e cision to go to war has not 'been made
and accepted by a majority of the people.' This statement can be
criticized very strongly, a statement that we would censure very
energetically If it w,e re made by a centrist. In place of accusing the
government of leading the American people to the slaughter against
the will of the majority, instead of accusing it emphatically before the
masses and of demonstrating to them 'h ow the parliamentarian majori.ty acts against the majority of the lPeople, Cannon endorses Roose-yelt's
decision as if it really corresponded to the majority of the people."

This impassioned rhetoric contains neither logic, nor Leninism,
nor understanding of my statement, nor an answer to it. "In the
first place," I didn't ((endorse Roosevelt's decision, as if it really
corresponded to the "majority of the people." I said, "the decision
(hypothetically) is accepted by a majority of the people," the decision which has been ((made" by others, for obviously one does
not "accept" a decision which he has made himself. But that is
only a small point which illustrates that the testimony was care·
lessly read before it was even more carelessly critic~zed. *
In the essence of the matter, the majority do in fact accept
and support~ either actively or passively, the "decision to go to
war." This is an incontestable fact, as shown by the complete
absence of mass opposition. It is this attitude of the majority
which we have to contend v;ith. The fact that the decision was
made by others does not help us. It is the attitude of the masses
toward the decision that we must contend with.
What can and what should we, as Leninists, do while the
masses maintain their present attitude? - that is the question.
To make our position clear it is necessary to complete the answer
given in the testimony which Munis broke off in the middle. He

*

From similar careles'Sness in reading the testimony, Munis blithely
represents us as "asking the expulsion from the party of the militants
who organize protests in the army," and of "disauthorizing agitation and
protests in t~ army." On the .contrary, we defended the right of such
agitation and protests, as a not too ha:sty reading of the testinwny will
convince anyone who is interested. What we "disauthorize" is futile
and suicidal individual "acts of insubordination and obstruction by members of our small party, acts whic'h could only isolate them from the
soldier mass under the given conditions and operate against the aim of
Winning over the majority. That is not the same thing as "dlsauthorlzing agitation and protests in the army."
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stops with our statement that ·"our comrades have to 'comply"
without adding the sentences which ' explain what is · meant by
"compliance." Here are the ex'p lanatory sentences .:
"Insofar as they are eligible for the draft, they must aecept that,
along with the rest of their generation, an:d go and lp erform the ;duty
imposed on them, until such ti'me as they convince the '/fIUJ,jor'J,tll tor (J
different policy."

When the quotation is restored in full text it begins to look
somewhat different than Munis hastily pictured it. It is nothing
rrlore or less than a warning; to individual workers of the vanguard,
who may be drafted, to "go with the rest of their generation" and
not waste their energy and militancy on individual resistance,
refusal of military service, etc. Was this warning correct? And
was it necessary? As to the correctness of the warning, from the
standpoint of Leninism, it will suffice to give two authoritative
quotations. The first is a representative extract from Lenin's
writings during the first W or ld War:
"The idea of refusing to serve in the army, of strikes against the
war, etc., is mere foolishness, it is the miserable and cowardly dream
of an unarm.e d struggle against an armed bourgeoisie, it is a weak
y.earning for the abolition of capitalism without a desperate civil war
or a series of wars." (Lenin: Collec~ed Works - Volume XVIII,
Page 88.)

The second quotation is from the fundamental theses, "War
and the Fourth International":
"If the proletariat should find it beyond its power to prevent war
by means of revolution,-and this is the only means of preventing war,
-the workers, together with the whole people will be forced to
participate in the army and in the war." (Page 33.)

This truth is presumably known to all revolutionists. But it
was not always known. During the first W orId War many of the
Lest proletarian militants in the United States knew no other way
to express their principled opposition to the imperialist war than
by individual resistance to conscription, objection to and refusal
of military service, etc. Much precious energy and courage were
wasted that way. In testifying before the court, with a view to
the publication of the testimony, we assumed that rank and file
\vorker militants, to whom Lenin's tactics are as yet unknown,
might read and be influenced by this warning; to "accept" with
the masses - "until such time as they convince the majority for
a different policy." Our words were primarily directed to them.
We were not even dreaming either of "endorsing Roosevelt's
decision" or of having to defend this ABC formulation within
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our . own movement. We simply intended to say, in words and
tone which we thought most efficacious from a propagandistic
standpoint in the situation, what Lenin said in February 1915:
"What should the Belgian Socialists have done? Since they could
. not accomplish a social revolution together with the FrenCh, etc.,
they had to submit to the majorif'V of the, nation at the present moment and go to war . . . . 'Citizens of B,e lgium! . . . W,e are in the
minority; I submit to you and go to war, but even in the war I shall
preach; I shall ,p repare the civil war of the proletariat of all countries
because outsid,e of it there is no salvation for the peasants and workers of Belgium and of other countries!'" (Lenin: Collected W'OrksVol. XVIII, Pages 115-116. Our emphasis.)

Lenin, you see, "submits to the majority." While he is in
the minority, what does he do? He "preaches" and "prepares."
If this policy "can be criticized very strongly," then let the criticism be directed against Lenin. He is the author of the policy.
We learned from him.
Munis quotes a sentence in the testimony: "We would not
support the war in a political sense." Now, this single sentence,
even standing by itself, is perfectly correct. But Munis is greatly
dissatisfied with it.
"Why, then, equivocate so dangerously?" he asks. "I see no other
reason ·b ut that our comrades have committed th.e very grave error
of talking for a :pettY-'b ourgeois jury for the more immediate present,
not foreseeing the future struggles. Would it not have b,een better to
state: 'Wb submit to your war, American bourgeois, because the
violenc.e of your society imposes it on us, the material violence of your
arms. But the masses will turn against you. From today on, our
'p arty is with the masses in an irreconcilable struggle against your
regime of oppression, misery and butchery. Therefore we will fight
'a gainst your war with all means.'" (Our emphasis.)

This agitational substitute for the position we elucidated at
the trial is false from beginning. to end, as we shall demonstrate.
The testimony explains what we mean by "political opposition" :
"'A: By that we mean that we do not give any support to any
imp,erialist war. We do not vote for it;· we do not vote for any person
that l}romotes it; we do not speak for it; we do not write for it. We
are in opposition to it." (Socialism on Trial, page 47.)

A declaration of war by the United States Government would
not change our position:
If the United States should enter into th.e European conflict,
what form would the opposition of the Party take to the war!
"A: We would maintain our position.
"Q:
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"Q: And that is what,
44A:: That is, we would not become supporters of the war, even
after the war was de,c lared. That is, we would remain an opposition
political party on the war question, as on others.
"Q: You would not support the war?
"A: That is what I mean, we would not support the war, in a
political sense." (IS ociaUsm on Trial, Page 48.)

Under cross-examination by the prosecuting attorney the position was made more emphatic and precise:
"Q: And you will seek to utilize war, during the war, to destroy
the pres.e nt form of Government, will you not?
"A: Well, that is no secret, that we want to change this form
of ·g overnment.
HQ: ~nd you look forward, do you not, to the forthcoming war
as the time when you may be able to accomplish that?
"A: Yes, I think the forthcoming war will unquestionably
weaken the imperialist governments in all countries.
~'Q:
You said, I believe, that you will not support the war!
You do not believe in National Defense at all, do you?
"A: Not in imperialist countries, no.
"Q: I am Slpeaking of this country?
"A: I believe 100 Ip er cent in defending this country by our
own means, but I do not believe in defending the imperialist governments of the worldU,Q: I am speaking about the Gov,e rnment of the United States
a;s , it is now constitutionally constituted. You do not believe in
defending that. do you?
"A: Not in a political sense, no.
"Q: You do not 'believe in defending it in any sense, do you?
I" A': I explained the other day, if the 'm ajority of the people
decide on war, and partf.cipat~ in the war, our people and the people
under our influence will also participate in the war. W~
not
sabotage the war, w.e do not obstruct it, but we continue to prQlPagate
our ideas, calling for a cessation of the war and calling ;for a change
in government." (S()ciaUsm on Trial, Page 106.)

do

When Mr. S~hw~inhaut, ' pursuing the question to the very
end, introduced the summary paragraph of the War Manifesto 'o f
the Fourth' International, he was answered by an affirmation of
that document which was completely devoid of any "alnbiguity"
or "inexactness":
"Q: Now, o'n June 29, 1940, the Socialist Appeal published this
from the report of the Manifesto of the Fourth International: ~Inde
, , pendently of the course of the war, we fulfill our ,b asic task: We
explain ,to the work€rs the irreconcilability betw.e en their interests
and the interest of bloQd-thirsty 'capitalism; we mobilize the toilers
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against imperialism; w:e .p ropagate the unity of the workers in all
warring and neutral countries; we call for the fraternization of workers and soldiers within each -country, and of soldiers with soldiers on
the opposite side Q1f the battle front; we mobilize the women and
youth against the war; we carryon constant, !persistent, tireless
preparation of the revolution-in ·the factories, in tb,e mills, in the
villages, in the barracks, at the front and in the fleet.' You want the
soldiers to do that, don~t you 1"
"A: Yes, I think t hat is a summation of the idea, for the soldiers
and ev~rybody to do that. That is the way to .p ut an end to this
slaughter." (Socialism on Trial, Page 111.)

In the face of these quotations from the court record one is
reasonably entitled to ask: What does Comrade M unis want of us?
What more needs to be said before the capitalist court, or in a
popular propagandistic exposition anywhere? N either Lenin nor
Trotsky, to ' judge by their own writings, would demand more
of our party.
.
Trotsky, who was an internationalist to his heart's core, explained that a socialist party, which was in the minority at the
outbreak of the first World War, was required to and could only,
take up a position of politicaJ opposition until such time as "the
change in the feeling of the working masses came about." That
is the way he expounded the problem in "War and the International." This book, written during; the first World War and published
in the United States under the publisher's title, "The Bolsheviki
and World Peace," is one of the classics upon which our move~ent has been raised and educated. Trotsky wrote:
"The advance guard of the Social 'D emocracy feels it is in .the
minority; its organizatioruJ, in order to complete the organization of
the army, are wrecke~. , Under such conditions ther.e can be no
thought of a revolutionary move on the part _of the Party. And all
this is quite independent of whether the people loo~ upon a particular
war with favor or disfavor. In spit.e of the colonial chara-cter of the
Ru.sso-Japanese war and its unpopularity in Russia, the first half
year of it nearly s'm othered the revolutionary movement. Consequently
it is quite clear that, with the b~st intentions in the world, the Socialist
.p arties canp.ot pledge themselves to obstructionist action at the 'time
of ,mobilization, at :a time, that is, when 'Socialism is more than eV,e r
politically iso~ated,. '
~'And therefore there is nothing particularly unexpected o~ dis, eouraging in the fact that the working-class ,p arlles ' did not oppose
military mobilization with their own revolutionary mobilization. Had
- the Socialists Umi-ted ,themselves to ,expressing condemnation' of the
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present War, had they d'e clined all responsibility for it and' refused
the vote of -confidence in their .governments as well as the vote for
the war credits, they would have done their duty at the time. They
would have taken up a po.sition of waiting, the oppositional character
of which would have :b een ,p:erfectly clear to the government as well
as to the people. Further action would have been determined by the
march of events and by those changes which the .e vents of a war
must produce on the Ip;e ople's consciousness. The ties binding the
International together would have 'b een pr:eserved, the })anner of
Socialism would have been unstained. Although weakened for the
moment, the Social ,Democra:cy would have pres.erved a free hand fQr a.
decisive interference in affairs as soon as the change in the feelings
of the working masses came about.'t (Th,e Bolsheviki and World Peace
-,Pages 175-177.)

The .sa~e idea was explained over again by ,T rotsky twentytwo years later in his testimony . before the Dewey Commission
in 1937. lIe still prescribes "political opposition" as a ~evolutionary
method. At that time France had a military alliance ' with the
Soviet Union · and he was asked ·'t he hYPDtheticq,l question by StDlberg:
'
.
.
' -'~You are a responsible revolutiona,r y figure. Russia and France
already have a military alliance. Suppose an internatiOOlalwar
breaks out .. ~ Wp.at w·o uld you say to the French working class iil
reference to the defeils.e' of the .S oviet Unlon? 'Change the French
bourgeoi:s g~v:ernment,' would you say?"

Trotsky's answer is especially interesting to us, si~ce the
United States .today stands in the pDsition of France of 1937 in
relation to' the Soviet U nion~ and the hypothetical war has become
a reality ~
"This question is more or less answered in the the~es, 'The 'War
and the Fourth International,' in this sense': In France I would
remain in opposition to th.e Government and would develop systematieally this opposition. In Germany 'I would do anything I could to
sa'botage the war ·m achinery. They are two different things. In
Germany and in Japan, I would apply military methods as far' as I
am able to fight, oppose, and injure the machinery, the militarY ' machinery of Japan, to disorganize it, both in Germany and Japan. In
France, it· is political opposition against · the bourgeoi's ie, and the
pre.p aration of the proletarian revolution. Both are revolutionary
methods. But in Germany and Japan I have as illy immediate aim
.th.e disorganization of th~ whol~ machinery. In France, I l1ave the
.aim of the proletarian revolution." (The Oase of Leon Trotsky, Pages
_ 289-2.90.l

In his ;"April Theses;". ··which . is -a 'sufficiently -authoritative
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document, since it was the program for the revolutionary struggle
of the Bolsheviks in Russia under conditions of war, Lenin thought
it enough, in dealing with the question of war and the governmen4
to say: "not the slightest concession must be made to 'revolutionary
defensism' " ; "No support must be given to t4e Provisional Government" because it is "a government of capitalists"; power must
be transferred to the Soviet; and then to add:
"In view of the undoubted 'h onesty of the mass of the rank-an41file believers in revolutionaTY d,e fensism, who ac.cept the war as ~
necessity only and not as a means of conquest; in view of the faCt
that they are being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary
thoroughly, persistently and patienltly to explaJ.n · their error to
them." (Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. VII , Pages 21-22.)
.

Political opposition ("No support to the Provisional ' Gove~n:"
ment") and propaganda ("patiently explain") - these are the
\veapons with which Lenin and Trotsky prepared ·' and finally 'carried through the proletarian revolution. They win suffice for us
too. Our propagandistic explanations of our war · policy . in the
Minneapolis court room are neither "opportunistic" 'nor "equivocaL"
'fhey contain the essence of the teachings and practice of Lenin
and Trotsky.
The alternative formulas of Comrade Munis, however, . con:,.
tain one error after another. According to him, we should have
said:
"We submit to your war, American bourgeois, because -the
violence of your society imposes it upon us, the material violence
uf your arms."
That is not correct. If that were so we would have no right
tc condemn acts of individual resistance. When militant workers
are put in fascist prisons and concentration camps because of their
socialist opinions and activities they submit,. but only through cqmpulsion, to "the material violence of arms." ·Consequently, indi~
viduals or small groups are encouraged and aided to IIdesert," to
make their escape whenever a favorable opportunity presents itself, without waiting for and without even consulting the majority
of the other prisonefis in regard to the action. The revolutionary
n10vement gains by such individual '''desertions'' because they can
restore the prisoner to revolutionary effectiveness which is largel)
shut off in prison. Trotsky, for example, twice "deserted" from
Siberia without incurring any criticism from the revolutionists.
Compulsory military service in war is an entirely .different
fDatter. In this ca,se .we submit primarily ~o the majority Qf the.
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workers who accept and support the war either actively or passively.
Since we cannot achieve our socialist aims without the majority
we must go with them, share their hardships and hazards, "and
win them over to our side by propaganda on the basis of commori
experiences. To accept military service under such circumstances
ic; a revolutionary necessity. Individual resistance, objection, de.sertion, etc. in this case - directly contrary to that of prisoners
escaping from "the violence of arms'" - constitute desertion of
class duty. The party, which applauds and aids the escaping prisener, .condemns draft dodgers and deserters: The escaped prisoner
frees ".himself to resume revolutionary work. The individual deserter from the military service cuts himself off from the mass
who have to make the revolution and thereby destroys his value.
, "From today on," Munis would have us say, "our party is
with the masses in an irreconcilable struggle against your regime
of oppression, misery and butchery. Therefore we will fight against
your war with all means."
The regime of the bourgeoisie is here justly described. The
rest of it is incorrect and contradictory; it "skips a stage" in the
t:volution of the attitude of the masses toward the war, and precisely that. stage which must be the point of "departture . for our
propaganda - the present stage. To say to the bourgeoisie, "The
masses will turn against you" in the future, means only that they
have not yet done so. It cannot logically be followed by the assertion, "from today on, our party is with the masS'e's in an irreconcilable struggle, etc."
.
/
The masses today} thanks to all kinds .of compUlsions and deceptions, and .the perfidious role of the labor bureaucracy and the
renegade socialists and Stalinists, are acceptingi and supporting
the war, that is, they are acting with the bourgeoisie and not with
us. The problem for our party is, first, to understand this primary
fact; second, to take up a position of ({Political opposition)); and .
then, on that basis, to seek an approach to the honestly patriotic
workers and try to win them away from the bourgeoisie and over
to our side by means of propaganda. That is the only "action" that
is open to us, as a small minority, at the present time.
. It .is also incorrect to say "we will fight against your ,var
with all means." While we are in the minority we fight with the
Marxist weapons of political opposition, criticism and propaganda
for ;:t workers' program and a workers' government. We reject
the pa~ifist "means" of abstention, the anarchist "means" of in-
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dividual sabotage and the Blanquist "me'a ns" of minority insurrection, the putsch.
It would appear that M unis' erroneous explanation of tfie
primary reason why a minority revolutionary party "submits" to
the war, his tendency to skip a stage in the workers' development
and his lack of precision in speaking of the struggle against the
war by "all means" - these errors lead him to slide over to equally
loose and ill-considered formulations as to those means of struggle
which are open, and advantageous, to the minority party of revolutionary socialism.

7. Marxism and Sabotage
The everlasting talk about "action," as if a small mihority
party has at its disposal, besides its propaganda - its "explanations" - some other weapons vaguely described as "actions" but
not explicitly defined, can only confuse and becloud the question
and leave the door open for sentiments of an anarchistic and Blanquist nature. We, following all the Marxist teachers, thought it
necessary to exclude such conceptions in order to safeguard the
party from the danger of condemning itself to futility and destruction before it gets a good start on its real task at this time: to
explain to the masses and win over the majority.
That is why we utilized the forum of the trial to speak so
explicitly about ou~ rejection of sabotage. That is why we denied
all accusations in thi"s respect so emphatically. Not - ,:with Munis'
permission - for lack of "valor," but because, as Marxists, we do
not believe in sabotage, terrorism, or any other device which sub.stitutes the actions of individuals or small groups for the action
of the masses. ,
There can be no two positions on this question. , Marxist
authorities are universal on one side - against sabotage as an in<;!ependeJ).t means of revolutionary ,struggle. This "weapon" belongs
i~ the arsenal of anarchism.
Sabotage was once the fashion in this country - 'i n the politically primitive days before the first W orId War. Imported from
France where it was advertised, as a miraculous remedy by the
anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists, sabotage was taken up by the
I.W.W., the left socialists, and the radical intellectuals, who in
those days had a decidedly anarchistic hue . . It seemed for a time
to offer a wonderful short cut to victory for a movement which
wasn't doing so well with the humdrum job of educating 'and 'organizing the workers for mass action.
'
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The consequences of this anarchistic folly were disastrous for
the LW.W. The advocacy of sabotage only repelled the masses
and left the LW.W. members in a legally indefensible position.
To avoid complete alienation from the workers, and for sheer
self-preservation of the organization in the face of prosecutions
during the war, the LW.W. was compelled to drop the "weapon"
of sabotage overboard with the most unseemly haste.
Those who have memories of this unhappy experience, especially those who, as participants in the American syndicalist
movement, burned their fingers on this hot poker, will be least
of all inclined to play with the idea of sabotage again. Sabotage'
is not the slogan of proletarian power and confidence but of pettybourgeois futility and despair.
The fundamental theses, "War and the Fourth International,"
state categorically:
"'I ndividualistic and anarchistic slogans of refusal to undergo
military service, passive resistance, desertion, sabotage are in basic
contradiction to the methods of the proletarian revolution." (War and
the Fourth International-Page 33. Our emp·h asis.)

Lenin wrote:
"Not the sabotaging of .the war, not . undertaking s·p oradic indi·
vidual acts in this direction, but the conducting of '11UJ8's propaganda
(-and not only among 'civilians') that leads to the transformation of
the war into civil war .... W.e do not sabot(J){Je the 'War, 'b ut we
-struggle against chauvinism. . . ." (Lenin: Collected Works, Vol.
XVIIiJ, Page 74. Our emphasis.)

Munis is especially indignant at our rejection of sabotage in
the testimony, but he is wrong in his criticism and wrong even,
it w'ould appear, ' in his understanding of the question:
"The defendants," he says, "saw themselves forced to condemn
; sabotage in general, as though it dealt with something criminal."

Again: "For moments there is evidence that the defendants really consider sabotage a crime. If I am mistsk€n-and I hope I am:-this is
a dangerous moral predisposition."

To that we can only answer with the French expression: "It
is worse than a crime - it is a blunder." As to the "moral" aspect of the question - that does not exist for us. Our considerations in this respect are exclusively political.
Of course, if one wants to discard precision of definitions and
dump everything into one ' pot loosely described as "actions," disre.garding proportion, circumstance, and the relation between actions w'hich are primary and fundamental and those ,vhich are
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subordinate and au%iliary - in that case we can argue endlessly
in a closed circle. But Marxism abhors vagueness of expression;
it calls things by their right names - precisely.
Sabotage, to us, means individual acts of obstruction and de.. truction, substituted for mass action. That is the way Marxism
defines it and, thereby, condemns it. Similarly, individual terrorism. But it is necessary to understand that such actions have one
quality when employed as substitutes for mass action and another
quality when subordinated to and absorbed by mass action. Marxism is opposed to terrorist assassinations, for example, but not
to wars of liberation waged by the oppressed masses, even though
\<\lars entail some killing of obnoxious individuals. So, also, with
acts of obstruction and destruction as part of and subordinate to
wars waged by the masses, not as substitutes for them. "Terrorism" and "sabotage" are then no longer the same things. Everything changes, including the attitude of Marxists, according to
what is dominant and what is subprdinate in the circumstances.
Thus, if it is argued that Trotsky, in his answer to Stolberg,
a~ked for sabotage of the military machinery in Germany and
japan, it must be pointed out that his proposal was made only in
the event of war against the Soviet Union. Then sabotage in Gernlany and Japan would be not an independent revolutionary action
but a secondary military measure of support to the mass action
of the Red Army. Trotsky never asked for sabotage as a means
of overthrowing a fascist or any other type of bourgeois regime
from within.
Comrade Munis seems to invest sabotage with a virtue in its
own right. We, on the other hand, admit "sabotage" only ' as a
minor auxiliary factor in mass actions; that is, when it is no
longer sabotage in the proper sense of the term. The difference is
quite fundamental.
M unis writes: "I believe that sabotage is a method for tactical
use whose application at certain moments can be productive of
contrary effects to what is intended." (Our emphasis.)
This/ is putting the question upside down. Sabotage produces
4'contrary effects," not once in a while but always, when it is employed by itself as a substitute for mass action; like all anarchistic
methods it tends to disorganize and demoralize the mass movement
which alone can bring us to socialism through the proletarian revolution. M unis' formulation, contrasted to that of Trotsky in his
article, "Learn to Think," shows a great difference of conception.
1·rotsky wrote:
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"The proletarian party does not resort to artificial methods, such
as ·b urning warehouses, setting off bombs, wrecking trains, etc., in
order to bring about the defeat of its own government. 'E;ven if it
w,e re successful on this road, the military defeat would not at all
lead to revolutionary success, a success whi-ch can be assured only
'by the inde.pendent movement of the proletariat....
"The m·e thods of struggle change, of course, when the struggle
enters the o.penly revolutionary phase. Civil war is a war, and in
this aspect has its :p articular laws. In civil war, ,b ombing of warehouses, wrecking of trains and all other forms of military 'sabotage'
are inevitable. Their appropriateness is decided 'b y 'p urely mil.i tary
considerations-civil war 'Continues revolutionary tpolitics but by
other, precisely, ·m ilitary means." (Trotsky: Learn to Think, The New
Int.er~ational, V;()l. IV-~o. 7, Page 207.)

Sabotage is admissible as a weapon of. the proletarian movement only "in quotat~on marks" as elucidated by Trotsky. That
is) when, strictly speaking, it is no longer sabotage, but a Ininor
military . measure supplementing mass action. Whoever speaks of
sabotage in any other framework does not speak the language of
~1arxism.

8. 'Defensive Formulations a -n d .the
Organization of Action
In general, it may be said that the · source of all the criticism '
of our expositions at the Minneapolis trial is to be found in the
apparent rejection of defensive formulations, and in cQunterposing
"offensive action" to them. But the essence of the whole question
consists in this, that defensive formulations prepare and help · to
create genuine mass actions, while "calls to action," not so prepared, usually echo in the void. It . is not by accident that those
revolutionists who understand this are precisely the ones .who have
shown the capacity to organize actions when the conditions for
them are present. The ultra-left sectarians, meantime, who do not
understand the best mechanism for the organization of actions -'
that is, .precisely, defensive formulations - always remain alone
and isolated with their impatient slogans and their self-imagined
intransigeance.
. Our critics explain our resort to defensive formulations by
the theory that our strateg.y in court was determined above all by
concern to obtain light sentences. "Our comrades ... try tcf make
an honorable impression on t~e j ury withou~ taking into consider- .
ation that they should talk for the masses." We seem to "have
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one policy for the masses and another for appearances before ~
bourgeois judge."
However, this appraisal of the motives of the defendants,
which falls short of flattery, is somewhat contradicted by the fact
that we immediately published the testimony in our press and
then republished it in thousands of copies in pamphlet form, "for
the masses." We do not deny anyone the right to his opinion as
to the moral content of our conduct at the trial, and we do not
i!ltend even to debate the question on that ground. In this domain
"actions speak louder than words." But we shall attempt a political exposition, basing ourselves on Marxist authority, of the role
of defensive formulations in the organization of proletarian mass
action.
Also, defensive formulations are an indispensable medium
for teaching the masses, who will not be convinced by theory but
only by their own experience and propaganda r~lated thereto.
This experience of the masses proceeds in the main along the line
of defensive actions. That is why defensive formulations are most
easily comprehensible and represent the best approach of the revolutionary Marxists to the masses. Finally, it is a tactical and
legal consideration of no small importance in a bourgeOis-democratic country that defensive formulas partially disarm the class
enemy; or in any case, make their attacks more difficult and costly. Why should such advantages be thrown away?
Defensive formulations retain their efficiency in all actions
involving masses, from the most elementary economic strikes to
the open struggle for power. Those' who aspire to organize action
ought to know this.
'
.American economic strikes have been ' explosively violent, and
the violence has not all been on one side. The institictivemilitancy
of the workers, as revealed in these strikes, would indicate that
vlhen the time comes for grandiose revolutionary actions, these'
same workers will remain true to their tradition and not be paralyzed by Quakerism.
_
Every str,ike leader ,worth his salt knows, however, that strikers are not mobilized and sent into action against strike-breakers,
thugs and law-breaking cops by lecturing them on the virtues ,of
violence and "calling" them to take the "offensive." The workers,
militant and courageous as they may be, prefer victory by peaceful
'means; and in this they only show good sense. In addition strikers,
at the beginning, almost invariably entertain illusions about the
itnpartiality of the public authorities and tend to assume that they,
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as well as the bosses and their hirelings, will respect the rights
of the strikers and the Justice of their cause.
They need experience, which as a rule is soon forthcoming,
to change their attitude and move them to militant action. They
need also some assurance that legal right is on their side. Strike
leaders wno seek not self-expression but victory in the strike, who
understand that it can be won only by means of mass solidarity
and mass action, must take these illusioris and sentiments of the
workers into account as the point of departure. Strike leaders can
in no case begin with loose-mouthed "calls" for violent offensive
action 'o f the strikers. The first task is to explain the implacable
nature of the struggle in . W~ich the self-interest of the bosses excludes fair play, .and the role of the public authorities as political
servants of the bosses; the. second task is to warn the workers
to expect violent attacks; and the third task is to prepare and organIze the workers. to defend the'mselve~ and their rights. Along these
lines, and as a !ule only along these lines, ,t he .struggle can be con~ciously developed ' in tempo and scope. The most e~fective mass
action
the ;' st,rikers,as eyery experienced organizer of mass
actions knows, is organized and carried out under defensive slogans.
Matters an~' no different when the workers' mass action ' asc.ends ,f rom the elementary field.of th~ economIc strike to the topmost peak of the class s,t ruggle - the open fight for political
power. H 'ere also the action proceeds under defensive slogans
and, to a very large extent, also under cover of legality. Trotsky
has demonstrated this so convincingly in his monumental "History
of the Russian Revolution," that there remains no ground for
serious debate in our ranks on the subject. To the student it should
be sufficient to say: There is the book; go and read it. To the
critic who imagines, without having thought the matter out, that
defensive formulations signify squeamishness, or hedging on principle, 'we say and we shall prove: That is the way the Great Russian Revolution was organized and carried through to victory.
Here is the way Trotsky explains the question:

of

HTh'e attacking side is almost always interested in seeming on
the -defensive. A revolutionary party is interested in legal coverings.
The coming Congress of Soviets, although in essenc.e a Soviet of
revolution, was neverthel'e ss for the whole ,p opular m·a ss indubitably
endowed, if not with the whole sovereignty, at lea-st with a good half
of it. It was , a question of one of the elements of a dual power
making an insurrection against the other. Appealing to the Congress
as the source of authority, the ' Military Revolutionary Committee
'accused . the g~vern~~t i~ a9vance of .p reparing an. attempt against,
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the soviets. This aceusation flowed logically from the whole situation. Iusofar as the government did not inten<L to capitulate without
a fight it could not help getting ready to defend its,elf. But by this
very fact it became liable to the accusation of conspiracy against the
highest organ of th~ workers, soldiers and -p easants. In its struggle
'a gainst the Congress of Soviets which was to overthrow Kerensky,
the government lifted its hand against that source of power from
which Kerensky had issued.
"It would, be a serious m.istake to regard all this as juridicaJ
hair-splitting of no interest to the people. On the contrary, it was ita
j ust this form that the fundamental facts of the revolution re/lectetJ
them.selves in the minds 01 the masses." (Trotsky: History of the Rus-

sian Revolution-Vol. III, Page 279. Our emphasis.)

Again:
, "~though an insurrection can win only on the offensive, it develqP8 better, ,t h,e more it loo.ks lik~ self-defense. A piece of official
sea1ing-wa~ ~n ,the door of the Bolshevik ~ditorial rooms-as a miU,t,a ry ,measure t~at is not ,'m,u ch. But what a superb signal. for ,bat·
tIe!" (Trotsky: History of the ,Russian Revolution-Vol. III, Pages

207-208.)

On the night of the victorious insurrection the Bolsheviks
'accused th~ official government as ," conspi~a:t<?rs" ' making an
Jlassault" which had to be ', forcibly resisted:
,
4'Teiephono~aJ;llS ' to all districts ,' and units of the garrison announced the event: 'The enemy of the -p eople took the offensive during
the night. The Military R,e volutionary Committee is leading the
resistance to the assault ()f the , conspirators.' The conspiratorsthese were the ,institutions of the official gov.~rnment. From the pen
of revo,l utionary conspirators this term came as a ,surprise, but it
'Yholly , corresponded to th~ situation and to the f.eelings of the masses.'~ ,(Trotsky: History of the Russian Revolution-Vol. Ill, Page
208.) ,

This accusation was broadcast to the whole country. The
insurrection ' was justified as a reply to the "offensive" of the
enemy:
"The sailor Kurkov has remembered: 'We got word from Trotsky
to broadcast ... t hat the counter.;r,evolution had taken the offensive.'
Here' too the defensive , formulation concealed a summ()ns to - insurrection addressed to, the whole country." (Trotsky: History of the
Ru:ssian Revolution-Vol. III, Page 208.)

At every step, as the struggle unfolded and neared its climax,
the Bolsheviks clung to their defensive formula, not as a' petty
,..c.e<;eption but because that is the way the issue appeared to the
workers and soldiers. Even at a caucus of Bolshevik delegates to
the Soviet .Congress, held on October 24, that IS, th.e day of the
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insurrection, they still found it necessary to retain the "defensive
envelope of the attack." Says Trotsky:
"There eouldbe no talk of .e xpounqing before this caucus the
whole-plan of the insurrection. Whatever is said at a large meeting
inevitably gets abroad. It was still impossible even to throw off the
d-e fensive envelope of the attack without creating confusion in the
minds of certain units of the garrison. But it was necessary to make
the delegates. understand that a decisive struggle had already ·b egun,
and that it would remain only for the Congr.ess to crown it." (Trotsky:
History of the Russian Revolution.-Vol. III, Page 211.)

On October 23, the day before the insurrection, an all-city
conference of the Red Guard was held in Petrograd. The resolution adopted by the conference, says Trotsky:
"defined the Red Guard as 'an organization of the armed forces
of the proletariat for the struggle against counter-revolution and th,a
defense of the conquests of the revolution! Observe this: that twentyfour hours before tne insurrection the task was still defined in terms
of defense and not attack." (Trotsky: History of the Russian ~volu
tion-Vol. III, Page 18'8 .)

Naturally, being Bolsheviks, their defense" .had nothing in
common with the policy of folded arms. They were prepared for
eventualities but they never gave up the advantage of "seeming on
the defensive." Trotsky . spoke at the caucus of Bolshevik delegates
on the 24th:
H

"Referring to recent articles of Lenin, Trotsky demonstrated that
'a conspiracy does not contradict the .p rinciples of Marxism,' if objective relations make an insurrection possible and .iil;evita'ble. 'The
physical barrier on the -road to power must .b e overcome .b y· a blow... .'
However, up till now ·the policy of tne Military Revolutionary Committee has not .gone beyond the policy of self~defense. Of course this
self-defense must be understood in a sufficiently 'b road sense. To assure the publication of the Bolshevik press with the help of armed
forces, or to retain the Aurora in the waters of the Neva-'Comrades,
is that not self-defense?--!It is defenseP If the government intends
to arrest us, we have machine guns on the .roof of Smolny in prepa·
ration for such ~n event. 'That also, comrades, is a meaJ!lure ot
defense.'" (Trotsky: History of tne Ru&sian Revolution-Vol. III,
Pages 211'-212.)

Trotsky painstakingly explains how the . October revolution
was developed by defensive formulations from link. to link over
a period of thirteen or sixteen days during which "hundreds of
thousands of workers and soldiers took direct action, defensive in
form, but aggressive in essence." At the end of that time, the
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masses being fully mobilized, there remained "only a rather narrow
i'roblem"-the insurrection, the success of which was assured.
"The October revolution can be correctly understood only if you
do not limit your field of vision to its final link. ID uring the last days
of February the chess game of insurrection was played out from the
first moye to the last-that is to the surrender of the enemy. At the
end of October the main part of the game was already in the past.
And on the day of insurrection ·it remained to solve only 3.! rather
narrow .p roblem: mate in two moves. The period of revolution, therefore, must be considered t'O extend from the 9th of October, when the
conflict aoout the ,g arrison began, or from the 12th, when the
resolution
passed . to create a Military Revolutionary Co~mittee.
The enveloping maneuver extended over mo.r,e than two weeks. The
more decisive ,p art of it lasted five to six days-from the birth of the
Military Revolutionary Committee to th.e capture of the Winter
·Palace. DUring this whole period hundreds of thousands of workers
and soldiers took direct action, defensive in form, but aggressive in
essence. The final stage, when the insurrectionaries at last threw
off the qualifications of the dual power with its dubious legality and
defensive phr8JSeology, occupied ' emctly twenty-four hours: from 2
o'clock on the night of the 25th to 2 o'clock on the night of the 26th."
(Trotsky: History. of the RWlsian . Revolution~Vo~. III, Page 294.)

was

Up to the decisive moment the Bolsheviks not only insisted on
the defensive form of their actions; they also held onto Soviet
legality "of which the masses were extremely jealous." It must
have been a shock to Mr. Schweinhaut, the government prosecutor
at the Minneapolis trial, when we defended the "legality" of the
Octobeli revolution. He, like many others, imagined that Bolsheviks
disdainfully cast aside such trifles as legal justifications even when
they are available. The prosecutor must have been still more discom fitted when we proved the legality . of the revolution under
cross-examination. And we were not dissimulating. Trotsky
explained this question also in his refutation of Professor Pokrovsky
who had attempted to make fun of the (~legalistic" contentions of the
Bolsheviks. Trotsky would not let such arguments pass even in
the guise of jesting remarks. He answered:
"Professor Pokrovsky denies the very importance of the alternative ::
Soviet or party. Soldiers are no formalists, he laughs: they did not:
need a Congress of .soviets in order to overthrow Kerensky. With an~
its wit such a formulation leaves uneXI>lained the problem: Why
create soviets at all if the party is enough? 'It is interesting,' continues the professor, 'that nothing at all came of this aspiration to d()
everything almost legally, with soviet le'g ality, and the pow-er at the
last moment was taken not by the Soviet, but by an obviously "illegal"
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organization created ad hoc.' Pokrovsky here cites the' f8Jct · that
Trotsky was compelled 'in the name of the Military Revolutionary
Committee,' and not the Soviet, to declare the government of Kerensky
non-existent. A most, unexpected conclusion! The Military Revolutionary Committee was an elected organ of the Soviet. The leading
role of the Committee in the overturn did not in any sense 'Violate
that soviet legality which the 'p rofessor makes fun of but of w!hich
the mass,e s were extremely jealous." (Trotsky: History of the Russian
Revolution-Vol. 11[, Page 288.)

After these explanations of Trotsky about the defensive
slogans whereby the Bolsheviks organized their victoriotls struggle
for power it should not be necessary to say anything more on the
subject. The method here acquires unimpeachable authority by virtue of the fact that it was not only expounded, but also successfully
applied to the greatest revolution in history. In this light tne
defensive formulations employed by us in the Minneapolis trial, far
from being repudiated, must .be underscored more decisively. They
are the right formulations for a propagandistic 'a pproach to "the
American workers. And they are the best methods for the mobilization of the workers for mass action throughout all stages of the
development of the proletarian revolution in the United States.
New York) May 1942.
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